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The statutory corporate tax rates have declined during the recent decades. Devereux
et al. (2002), Griffit and Klemm (2004) and Loretz and Notes (2008) highlight the
importance of the decline and argue that the statutory corporate tax rates lowered
rapidly during the second half of the 1900s. Decline continues in the 2000s. During
the past 20 years the statutory corporate tax rates declined from approximately 30
percent to about 20 percent (OECD 2019). For example, one of the famous recent
reforms, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, lowered the statutory corporate tax
rate of United States from 35 percent to 21 percent.
This development may be a result of several factors. Knowledge of the distorting
nature of corporate taxation is more understood. Gained knowledge may affect tax
policies. On the other hand, political atmosphere may have an effect. Slemrod
(1992) argues that the shift in the macroeconomic paradigm in the 1960s and the
1970s meant a shift to more positive attitudes towards reducing tax rates. It is
also possible that the rise of digital economy affects corporate taxation. Kari and
Ropponen (2018) argue that the rise of digital business reveals issues in international
corporate tax system. Since countries do not have possibilities to affect the behavior
of digital businesses they reduce their level of corporate taxation.
One possible reason for the decline is international tax competition. International
competitive pressures may affect the corporate tax policies of countries. Especially
multinational corporations have possibilities to relocate and the tax rate differentials
may play a key role in the location choices. Governments may recognize this mech-
anism and behave strategically in tax policy setting. Tax policy responses of other
countries are taken into consideration when making tax policy choices. Devereux et
al. (2008) and Egger and Raff (2015), among others, find empirical evidence on tax
competition.
Tax competition is an important theme for multiple reasons. It is an interesting
phenomenon and it has implications for public finances. Tax competition may lead
to race to the bottom. This means that corporate tax rates may be driven down to
zero. Very low tax rates may mean very low tax revenues. Public expenditures are
increasing in many countries due to aging (Aalto et al. 2020; Sirviö 2020). Corporate
tax revenue is an important part of tax revenue and it may be problematic to unite
declining revenues and increasing expenditures.
Tax revenue has remained stable although statutory tax rates have declined as
Devereux et al. (2002) argue. This contradiction reveals the complexity of tax
competition. It may be that tax competition affects the total tax revenue through
another mechanism. Mooij and Nicodème (2008) argue that tax competition causes
a shift from the individual income tax revenue to the corporate tax revenue and
erodes the individual income tax revenue. On the other hand, the contradiction
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may be explained by increased economic activity (Fuest et al. 2020), tax base
broadening (Loretz and Notes 2008) or changes in the distribution of capital and
labor income.1
Tax competition is problematic for yet another reason. Tax competition is inter-
connected with tax avoidance as Faulhaber (2017) argues. Tax competition can be
viewed as actions of countries to attract firms whereas tax avoidance is the behavior
of firms to save taxes. Tax competition is, thus, partly caused by tax avoidance
behavior such as profit shifting and tax haven operations. Since tax avoidance be-
havior offers some agents different rules tax competition may through tax avoidance
be a problem for the legitimacy of the tax systems as Sirviö (forthcoming) argues.
Although there is empirical research on tax competition it is especially a theo-
retical research topic. The idea of tax competition is present in the work of Tiebout
(1956) and Oates (1972) but the first formal models of tax competition are presented
by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). These models argue apply-
ing a framework in which firms optimize and governments maximize utility of the
representative agent that tax competition leads to underprovision of public goods
in Samuelson‘s (1954) sense.
First models of tax competition consider a situation in which countries are sym-
metric and capital is perfectly mobile. The key result of these models is that an
increase of corporate tax rate in one country results in an outflow of capital to other
countries. Countries with lower corporate tax rates attract the capital. Countries
need to take into consideration the corporate tax policy of other countries. Coun-
tries do not cooperate and end up setting corporate tax rates too low. This implies
that public goods are underprovided.
After the first models tax competition literature has expanded. The first ex-
tensions consider tax competition in cases with, for example, asymmetric countries
(Bucovetsky 1991) or imperfect competition (Hoyt 1991). More recent tax compe-
tition literature considers current issues in corporate tax environment. There is, for
example, a growing discussion about tax havens and their impact on tax revenue
and welfare of the high tax countries (Slemrod and Wilson 2009; Hong and Smart
2010).
Part of tax competition literature focuses on reviewing earlier literature. There
are two broad literature reviews focusing on different aspects of tax competition.
Wilson (1999) reviews tax competition in different institutional frameworks and
adds layers to basic tax competition model. The main conclusion of the review is
that the underprovision result holds with assumptions more general than in Zodrow
1There is little evidence on the dynamics between tax competition and the distribution between
capital and labor income. However, the share of labor income has declined in many countries in
the long run (Rodriguez and Jayadec 2010; Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014). This development
may help to explain the contradiction between the development of tax rates and tax revenues.
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and Mieszkowski (1986). More recent review is provided by Keen and Konrad (2013).
The emphasis on their review is on policy issues relating to limiting tax competition.
In addition, there are reviews that are narrower in scope. Zodrow (2003) con-
siders tax competition literature in light of the European integration. The focus is
on the policy view. Baskaran and Lopes de Fonseca (2014) focus on the possible
tax harmonization of the European Union countries. Genschel and Schwarz (2011)
present literature review that differs from other tax competition literature reviews
by considering less theory and more the institutional framework and the legislational
views. Zodrow (2010) considers in which manner is capital mobile and how has the
mobility affected tax competition.
Based on an analysis of the earlier survey literature there is a gap in it. There
is no literature review that would provide a comprehensive outlook on different
institutional issues studied in tax competition framework. For example, effect of
labor markets, agglomeration and political process are studied in tax competition
literature. In addition, there is no literature review that would provide survey of
different methodologies applied to model tax competition. Early models of tax
competition build on microeconomic framework but also macroeconomic models are
important part of the tax competition literature.
This thesis aims to fill the gaps in the review literature. The research question
of the thesis is that how should the canonical tax competition model be defined and
what are the implications of tax competition according to the theoretical literature.
In order to answer these questions theories of tax competition are reviewed.2 Keen
and Konrad (2013) argue that the future research requires less simplistic view on
international tax regime. This, in turn, requires a deeper understanding of the insti-
tutional issues and their role in tax competition. On the other hand, less simplistic
view on international tax regime can be obtained by widening the methodology
applied to study tax competition.
This thesis focuses on describing tax competition and the dynamics of it. In order
to make the analysis more approachable the research question is divided to themes.
The first theme concerns the definition of the canonical tax competition model.
Earlier tax competition literature uses definitions like the canonical tax competition
model and workhorse models. There is no agreement on the definitions. Different
reviews and different research articles include partly different models to these def-
initions. Therefore, this thesis reflects the differences in the earlier literature and
provides a new definition for the canonical tax competition model. This definition
aims to harmonize the terminology applied in the literature.
2This thesis focuses on international corporate tax competition. Sometimes tax competition
refers to commodity tax competition. This strand of literature started from the model by Keen
and Kabur (1993). Another prominent field in the tax competition literature is regional tax
competition. Some of these models are briefly discussed in this thesis but the main focus is on
international corporate tax competition.
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The second theme of the research question is focused on the implications of tax
competition. Three subquestion are posed. Firstly, is it considered whether the clas-
sical underprovision result holds with more general assumptions. This subquestion
tests whether the result of Wilson (1999) presented earlier can still be reproduced.
The underprovision result is an important part of tax competition literature. Some
models apply a different methodology and do not model underprovision of public
goods. The second subquestion is that what are the most important implications of
the models that do not model underprovision of public goods. There is disagreement
in tax competition literature whether tax competition is harmful or not. The third
subquestion is to whether it is suitable to call tax competition harmful or not.
Recent tax competition literature studies important themes such as limiting
tax competition and empirical views on tax competition. Compared to the review
focusing on coordination issues by Keen and Konrad (2013) this thesis reverses the
set-up. Issues of limiting tax competition are important but out of the scope of this
thesis. In addition, empirical tax competition literature is important field in modern
tax competition literature but out of the scope of this thesis3.
The methodology of the thesis is descriptive integrative literature review. Tax
competition literature is reviewed focusing on describing the literature and inte-
grating it to reasonable entities. Salminen (2011) argues that descriptive literature
review allows to describe certain phenomenon throughoutly and categorize parts of
the phenomenon. Baumeister and Learyn (1997) argue that literature review is an
ambitious way to develope current theory and to build new theories. Theory can be
evaluated using literature review. It seems natural to choose descriptive integrative
literature review as the methodology for descriping the theories of tax competition.
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two discusses the institutional backround
of tax competition. Chapter three discusses the canonical tax competition model.
Chapter four furthers the perspectives on theories of tax competition. Chapter five
concludes.
3For a literature review on the empirics of tax competition see Leibrecht and Hochgatterer
(2012).
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2 Perspectives on corporate taxation and tax com-
petition
This chapter describes the institutional backround of tax competition. One of the
key issues is the definition of tax competition. Although tax competition has an
intuitive definition literature provides more spesific definition. Tax competition is
strongly related to the historical development of corporate tax systems and the
principles of international corporate taxation. These issues are discussed in two
subchapters first of which discusses the early history of modern corporate tax system
while the second focuses on recent issues and initiatives to limit tax competition. In
addition, behavioral effects of tax competition are discussed.
Before proceeding to the subchapters it is useful to discuss the role of corporate
income taxation in a more general level. Schjelderup (2015) argues that corporate
income tax is useful because it serves as a backstop for personal income tax. If there
would be no corporate taxation wealthy individuals would be able to shift their
labour income to corporate income and pay no taxes. Corporate tax may also be
useful for limiting income shifting between labour and capital income. Corporate
tax is also a withholding tax on non-resident shareholders. Similar arguments in
favor of taxing corporate income are given by Mirrlees et al. (2011) who also argue
that taxing corporate income is important due to administrative inconvience and
because of the backstop role of it.
Optimal capital tax theory is a prominent field which discusses the optimal
amount of taxation. Although this field is out of the scope of this thesis it has
interesting implication for corporate income taxation. Based on the optimal tax
theory there may or may not be a positive corporate income tax. The early studies
of optimal capital taxation by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) find that the op-
timal level of capital taxation is zero in the long run. This implies that corporate
tax should be set to zero. These models obtain asymptotical result of no capital
taxation using a general equilibrium model. Straub and Werning (2020) question
the assumptions used by Chamley (1986) and derive positive optimal capital tax
rate using the same model. In addition, Saez and Stancheva (2018) derive positive
capital tax rates applying a different methodology.
2.1 Definitions of tax competition
Before proceeding further tax competition must be defined. There is no common
definition of tax competition. Instead many definitions are used in the literature.
Different definitions highlight different aspects of tax competition. The simplest
definition of tax competition is that it is strategic behavior when setting corporate
tax regimes or a situation in which governments experience international competitive
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pressures when setting corporate tax regimes. These definitions are useful for every
day use but literature provides more spesific definitions.
Early definitions of tax competition by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) focus on
highlighting the implications of tax competition. In a sense both of these definitions
view tax competition as a situation in which governments experience pressures to
lower corporate tax rates. Pressures are in place because otherwise factors of pro-
duction may move to other regions. Tiebout (1956) concludes that tax competition
is good because it implies that the preferences of the agents and the tax rates are
consistent. Governments translate the preferences of citizens to suitable tax rate to
provide the preferred amount of public goods. Oates (1972) argues that tax compe-
tition may be harmful because it may lead to a situation with too little money for
public good provision. Thus, these approaches differ by the implications of tax com-
petition. These definitions highlight the hamrfulness or efficiency enhancing nature
of tax competition.
Instead of highlighting the implications of tax competition the definition of Wil-
son (1986) highlights the government actions in tax competition. Wilson (1986)
divides tax competition to two classes. In the first case regions try to encourage
investments through preferential treatment of certain industries or invesment types.
In the second case regions want to increase the total level of capital investment by
lowering their tax rates on capital. These definitions are broad and useful. They
also depict what tax competition may mean in practice.
More spesific economic theory definitions of tax competition are presented by
Wilson and Wildasin (2004). According to their definition tax competition is non-
cooperative tax setting by independent governments such that these decisions affect
the allocation of mobile tax base(s) among different countries. There is no cooper-
ation between national governments in setting tax rates and part of the tax base is
mobile. This means that capital moves across the borders. Mobility of capital is a
crucial assumption of theoretical tax competition models presented in the following
chapters.4
Statutory corporate tax rates are only one part of corporate tax regimes. In
addition to statutory corporate tax rates governments may compete through prefer-
ential treatment or tax bases and depreciation allowances5. Thus, tax competition
is a wider phenomenon than just competitive tax setting. The definition of Wilson
and Wildasin (2004) can be seen to include other forms of competition. However, it
favors to widen the definition and highlight the role of other forms of competition.
This can be done by defining that instead of discussing about tax setting tax regime
4According to another definition of Wilson and Wildasin (2004) tax competition is defined to be
noncooperative tax setting which affects the allocation of tax revenues between countries. Instead
of the allocation of tax bases this definition highlights the role of the allocation of tax revenue.
5For a wider discussion of the role of preferential treatment and depreciation allowances in tax
competition see chapter 3.2.5.
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setting is discussed. Therefore, this thesis uses a modified definition of Wilson and
Wildasin (2004) and defines that
tax competition is noncooperative tax regime setting by independent
governments such that these decisions affect the allocation of mobile tax
base(s) among different countries.
This definition highlights that in addition to statutory tax rates tax competition
may occur through other parts of tax system such as tax bases.
From the viewpoint of this thesis the aforementioned definition is sufficient. How-
ever, part of the literature defines tax competition based on whether it is harmful
or not. Definitions of harmful tax competition are more present in policy discussion
such as in OECD (1998) and in international law literature. Faulhaber (2017) dis-
cusses the division between harmful and non-harmful tax competition. For example,
the overall low tax rates are not harmful tax competition but preferential treatment
regimes are. Preferential treatment provided to immobile tax bases is not harmful
tax competition. Tax havens are a part of harmful tax competition if the tax haven
country is on the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions and lacks good governance6.
If a tax haven country has good tax governance tax competition is not harmful. In
the case of tax havens the quality of governance is, thus, an important issue when
studying the possible harmfulness of tax competition.
Policy definitions of tax competition are interesting also because they live in
time. Faulhaber (2017) argues that the definitions of harmful tax competition have
changed from the early 2000s. The early 2000s definitions of harmful tax competi-
tion did not explicitly define tax havens or common tax base ideas which are present
in the broader definitions of late 2010s. In addition, it is argued that tax compe-
tition and tax avoidance complement each other. Tax competition is often seen as
the phenomenon in which governments compete in setting tax regimes to attract
investments and firms. Tax avoidance is often seen as the phenomenon in which
individual tax payers seek to exploit the opportunities to avoid taxes in especially
countries with higher taxation. Thus, tax competition and tax avoidance can be
seen as the reverse sides of the same issue.
2.2 History of corporate tax systems
Early modern corporate tax systems and principles of international corporate tax-
ation were created at the turn of the 1900s. There were not many multinational
corporations that operated in many countries. However, governments wanted to
avoid the possibility of double taxation. Double taxation means a situation in which
6The list of non-cooperative regions is an effort by the European Union to enhance the inter-
national tax system. See Euroopan unionin neuvosto (2020) for a wider discussion.
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the profit is taxed both in the home country of the multinational corporation and
in the country of the affiliate. Therefore, there was un urge to set the principles of
international corporate taxation.
The principles of international corporate taxation were created based on the
work by a committee of the League of Nations in 1920s. The principles designed
by the committee can be summarized by three pillars of international corporate
taxation as Zucman (2014) does. The first pillar is that the tax should be paid on
source country basis. Source country means the country where production happens.
The second pillar is that multinational corporations should apply the arm‘s lenght
principle. This means that the products should be sold with the same price to the
buyers outside than those inside the corporation. The third pillar is that corporate
tax issues should be solved by bilateral treaties between governments.
At the beginning of the 1900s corporate tax rates were relatively small. However,
corporate tax rates increased during the first half of the century and peaked in the
1950s and 1960s. For example, according to Internal Revenue Service‘s statistics in
United Stated the corporate tax rate was often above 50 percent in these decades.
The statutory corporate tax rates declined from the 1960s onwards (Devereux et al
2002; Griffith and Klemm 2004; Loretz and Notes 2008). Griffith and Klemm (2004)
find that the corporate tax revenues as a share of the gross domestice product have
remained relatively stable on the period from 1965 to the beginning of the 2000s.
In addition, they find that the corporate tax revenues as a share of the total tax
revenue have declined from 1960s to 1980s but remained stable after that.
It is interesting that the statutory corporate tax rates decline but the tax rev-
enues remain stable. One explanation may be that governments decreased statutory
tax rates but broadened tax bases. Loretz and Notes (2008) highlight the role of
base broadening. Slemrod (2018) even argues that lowering the statutory tax rate
and broadening the tax base became a synonyme for corporate tax reform. For
corporations tax base is the difference between costs and revenues. Tax base can
be broadened, for example, by restricting depreciation allowances. If corporate tax
base is broader the same amount of revenue can be collected via a lower statutory
tax rate. On the other hand, contradiction between declining tax rates and stable
revenue may be a result of other issues discussed in introduction.
Several issues may explain the decline of corporate tax rates. Tax competition is
studied in a broader manner in this thesis. However, tax competition itself may not
be sufficient explanation for declining corporate tax rates. As seen in the following
chapter, theoretical tax competition literature rests on the assumption of interna-
tionally mobile capital. Capital was not mobile for part of the 1900s. To understand
the decline of corporate tax rates one would have to understand how did the free
movement of capital occur in the late 1900s.
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Globalization and intellectual trends may have an impact on the mobility of cap-
ital. These issues are out of the scope of this thesis but there is at least narrative
evidence on the effect they have. Slemrod (1992) argues that activist macroeconomic
policy was at the high point in the 1960s and that the rise of the fear of stagnation,
among other issues, resulted in the rise of supply side economics. For tax policy
supply side economics meant that the reduction of tax rates was almost a value
in itself. The change in the paradigm of macroeconomics may have an impact on
economic policy. On the other hand, increased international competition for invest-
ment is possible because the movement of capital is freer than before. Liberating
the capital markets is, in turn, a part of globalization which has amplified again
since the 1970s as Taylor (2009) argues.
2.3 Recent initiatives to limit tax competition
The principles of international corporate taxation are designed for a different busi-
ness environment than that of the 2000s. Therefore, it may be hard to apply these
principles in current business environment (Kari and Ropponen 2018). For example,
one of the principles is that tax should be paid to the source country. Defining the
source country may be problematic in the current business environment with dig-
ital business platforms. On the other hand, current business environment consists
issues such as tax havens which make it hard for governments to use their taxing
power7. Because of these issues countries are willing to reconsider the principles of
international corporate taxation.
Issues of international corporate taxation often demand international coopera-
tion. A prominent form of international cooperation is The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development‘s (OECD) work to prevent harmful tax com-
petition and the fight against corporate tax avoidance. The base erosion and profit
shifting initiative (BEPS) is important as a part of this work. The objective of
this initiative is to prevent erosion of corporate tax bases and limit profit shifting.
Part of the work is done through pillars one and two. The first pillar focuses on
issues relating to division of taxing rights and pillar two focuses on a proposal on
minimum tax rate in order to prevent tax competition. Dharmapala (2019) argues
that the initiatives of OECD may be effective in limiting profit shifting and that the
phenomenon may, in fact, be disappearing.
OECD (2020a) reflects the issues relating to pillar one framework. The main
challenge in current business environment is that the firms are able to generate
profit in a way that makes taxing rights hard to allocate. In pillar one framework
profits would be allocated in a way that consolitated financial accounts would serve
as a starting point. Tax base would be determined in a way that complexity and
7For a wider discussion on tax havens see chapter 4.5.3.
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burden for tax administration would be minimized. In addition, double taxation
would be eliminated. There would also be a new multilateral tax certainty process
and a new multilateral convention which would implement the solution proposed.
On the other hand, pillar two would especially address remaining base erosion
and profit shifting challenges by setting out a rule which allows countries to “tax
back” in cases where other countries have not applied their primary taxing rights
(OECD 2020b). The pillar two propositions would ensure that the firms pay at
least a minimum level of tax. Pillar two framework provides rules for calculating the
effective tax rate and the allocation of the top-up tax for certain systems provided
in the framework. In addition, pillar two framework provides model legislation.
Multilateral convention is included to the framework of pillar two as it was in the
framework of pillar one.
2.4 Behavioral effects of corporate taxation
Taxation affects the amount of goods produced and creates welfare losses since the
optimal amount of production may not be produced. In addition, taxation has
effects on real economic activity. For example, Romer and Romer (2010) show that
tax increases have negative effect on economic growth. On the other hand, corporate
taxation has effects on the behavior of the firms.
In modern business environment multinational corporations operate in many
countries. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment in which a multinational
corporation invests in operations in other countries than it‘s home country. Tax
policies may affect the incentives to invest in a certain country. Higher tax rate
means lower after-tax returns. Other issues such as regulatory policies may also
affect the decision of investment. Hines (1999) reviews the empirical literature on
behavioral responses to international taxation and finds that corporate taxation
affects foreign direct investment. Tax elasticity of investment is found to be -0.6.
This means that if there is a ten percent differential in tax rates there is six percent
less investments in the country with higher tax rate. Higher tax rate may lead to a
lower level of investment.
Later literature amplifies the result that higher taxation has negative effects
on foreign direct investment. Meta-studies collect and analyze the results of stud-
ies identifying the relationship between taxation and foreign direct investment. The
meta-study by Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) creates a data set using 29 earlier studies
and computes pooled fixed effect estimators and random effects estimators. The me-
dian tax semi-elasticity of foreign direct investment found is 2.49 while the weighted
average of semi-elasticities is 2.55. If publication selection bias is considered the
elasticity declines to 2.28 or 1.19. In addition, aggregate elasticities seem to be
higher than the firm level elasticities.
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In addition to choosing the location of foreign direct investment multinational
corporations may respond to tax rate differentials by shifting profits. Profit shift-
ing means that multinational corporations may shift paper profits from high tax
countries to low-tax countries. Dharmapala (2014) argues that multinational corpo-
rations use especially transfer mispricing, inner loans and the location of immaterial
rights as means to shift profits. These measures take advantage of the system of
international corporate taxation by, for example, manipulating interest rates of con-
cern loans.
Although profit shifting is often legal corporate tax avoidance might not be ac-
ceptable in the eyes of governments and citizens. Economics literature has different
views on the acceptability of tax avoidance. Weisbach (2004) argues that tax avoid-
ance could be thought as one behavioral response to corporate taxation and it should
be punished only if it is socially optimal. On the other hand, authors like Zucman
(2014) emphasize the suspicious nature of corporate tax avoidance. Research liter-
ature does not have a common view about the acceptability of tax avoidance.
Regardless of the problems with defining tax avoidance empirical research finds
evidence on profit shifting behavior. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) conduct a
meta study using 27 earlier empirical studies and 203 estimates. They find a tax
semi-elasticity of pre-tax profit of 0.8. This means that if international tax rate
differentials increase by one percentage point the reported profits decrease by 0.8
percents. This study also concludes that studies using aggregate data have higher
estimates than studied using micro data and that it may be that aggregate data
studies have overestimated the scope of profit shifting.
Beer et al. (2020) review corporate tax avoidance literature and find semielas-
ticity of of reported pre-tax profit of unity. This is greater than concensus estimate
of 0.8 by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017). The authors argue that future research
should consider whether different tools of profit shifting are complements or substi-
tutes, how has corporate tax avoidance varied over time, between countries, and in
different sectors and how has the anti-tax avoidance rules affected.
Literature has also aimed to identify public finance consequences of profit shift-
ing. Lumme and Ropponen (2020) review the literature on tax revenue consequence
of profit shifting and evaluate that profit shifting means worlwide tax revenue losses
of hundreds of billions of dollars. On the other hand, Wang et al. (2020) argue
that there are multiple reasons related to firm-level charasteristic that may affect
the likelihood of a firm to engage in tax avoidance. Earlier studies show, for exam-
ple, that tax avoidance is less frequent in family firms (Chen et al. 2010), that tax
avoidance and the independence of the internal audit committee are negatively as-
sociated (Richardson et al. 2013) and that firm size and tax avoidance are positively
associated (Lisowsky 2010).
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Tax havens provide tax avoidance services and play a key role in tax competition.
Small countries providing concealment services and very low tax rates to firms and
wealthy individuals are called tax havens. Dharmapala and Hines (2009) argue that
tax haven country is usually small in the sense that they often have below one
million citizen and, in addition, it is often well governed and more affluent than
other similar countries. Dharmapala and Hines (2009) find approximately 40 tax
haven countries in the world. The impact of tax havens may be big. For example,
Tørsløv et al. (2018) argue that multinational corporations shift 40 percent of their
profits to tax havens.
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3 The canonical tax competition model
The first formal presentations of tax competition are provided by Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). These models formalize tax competition
using a framework with firm optimization and governments maximizing utility of
the representative agent. The main result of the first tax competition models is that
tax competition leads to inefficiently low corporate tax rates and inefficiently low
levels of public good supply. There is underprovision of public goods in Samuel-
son‘s (1954) sense. Later research applies partly different methodologies to study
tax competition. Kari and Lönnqvist (2001) divide tax competition literature to
two schools of thought. The first tradition is based on the ideas by Oates (1972)
which are formalized by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). The
second tradition is based on combining open economy macroeconomics and public
economics. One of the firsts formal models of this tradition is presented by Gordon
(1986)
On the other hand, the division by Kari and Lönnqvist (2001) cannot take into
account some of the new developments in tax competition literature. For example,
the tradition tracing back to the model by Mendoza and Tesar (2005) proposes
an approach that is based on dynamic general equilibrium models. Although this
approach can be seen as a part of the tradition based on international economics and
public economics it can also be seen as a separate tradition. This is because these
models develop the analysis further and have more complex modeling framework
than the earlier models. The division by Kari and Lönnqvist (2001) seems fruitful
when added a third school of thought. This category traces back to developments of
modern macroeconomic models such as dynamic general equilibrium models, growth
models and overlapping generations models8. This tradition uses large-scale models
to study the dynamics of tax competition. Although there are early models of this
kind such as Lejour and Verbon (1997) presented in chapter four this tradition is
further developed starting from the 2000s and still seeks it‘s place in tax competition
literature.
This chapter presents the model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) in detail and
considers it as the benchmark of tax competition. The effects of relaxing the key
assumptions of the benchmark model are discussed. In addition, workhorse models
are presented briefly. These models serve as a starting point for modeling but are
not as widely applied as the model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). The title of
this chapter refers to the canonical tax competition model. A discussion about how
this thesis views canonicality is provided in the end of this chapter.
8For a discussion on the development of modern macroeconomics see Vroey (2016).
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3.1 The benchmark model and workhorses
As discussed above this thesis refers to the model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) as the benchmark model. Their model is presented below. In addition, this
subchapter features a discussion about other important frameworks applied in tax
competition literature and referred as workhorse models of tax competition.
3.1.1 The benchmark model
The following discussion presents the benchmark model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986). World economy consists of large number of identical countries (i = 1, ..., N)9.
Firms in each country produce a numeraire good using labor and capital as the
factors of production. Capital is viewed as physical capital instead of financial
capital. This assumption is often used in tax competition literature. It ensures that
capital generates real output. Capital stock is fixed at the world economy level such
that K̄ denotes the aggregate capital stock. Each household supplies one unit of
labor. Capital is assumed to be fully mobile between countries whereas labor is
immobile. Identical households own labor and sell it to firms.
Firms have access to increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable and con-
stant returns to scale production technology. Production function is denoted by
F (Ki, Li) where Ki denotes capital stock and Li denotes labor. Assuming that the
production function is homogeneous of degree one and using constant returns to
scale properties allows to divide production with labor in order to write production
function in per capita terms. Writing the production function in per capita terms







= F (ki, 1) = f (ki) . Production function is applied to
produce a numeraire good.
The net profit of a firm is given as the difference between production and wage
income, capital income and taxes paid. Wages paid to the employees are denoted
by wi. Capital income paid to the owners of the firm is denoted by rki such that the
rate of return is r. Countries are assumed to be small in the sense that they cannot
affect the world rate of return which, thus, is equal to all countries. Taxes paid to
the government are denoted by tiki such that ti is the capital tax rate. Instead of a
pure profit tax in which tax is levied on the difference between revenues and costs
this model applies a tax on capital stock. The tax is collected by the government of
the country where production happens. This type of taxation is called source-based
taxation. The alternative would be to, for example, tax capital in a residence-based
system where tax is collected by the government of the home country of a firm.
9To be precise, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) consider an economy which consists of large
number of identical regions. Later literature has, however, reversed this assumption to concern
world economy with large number of identical countries. This is natural when dealing with inter-
national corporate tax competiton as in this thesis.
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With these definitions the net profits of a firm can be written as
f(ki)− wi − rki − tiki. (1)
Using net profits of a firm it can be shown that capital taxation is distorting. In this
case distorting tax means that an increase in capital taxation causes an outflow of
capital. Differentiating equation (1) with respect to ki yields the first-order condition
of the firm as
f ′ (ki)− r − ti = 0, (2)
where f ′ (ki) is the first derivate of the production function with respect to ki.
Equation (2) gives the net rate of return as r = f ′ (ki)− ti. On the other hand, the
marginal productivity of capital equals with the marginal cost of capital which can
be seen by reorganizing equation (2) as f ′ (ki) = r + ti.
Capital is an implicit function of the tax rate in equation (2). Since the net
rate of return given by r = f ′ (ki) − ti implicitly defines ki = ki (r + ti) such that









Implicit differentiation yields an equation that gives the effect of a change in the tax
rate to the capital stock of a country. The sign of this equation is negative since by
the assumptions of the production function f ′′ (ki) < 0. Equation (3) means that
increasing capital tax rate causes an outflow of capital to foreign countries. If one
country unilaterally increases it‘s capital tax rate capital outflows to other countries.
On the other hand, some country may try to attract capital by lowering it‘s tax rate
below the level of other countries. Thus, the capital tax is distorting.
So far the analysis has focused on firm behavior. Governments and citizens are,
however, an important part of the model. The government‘s objective is to maximize
utility of the representative citizen. Utility of the representative citizen is defined
through a strictly quasiconcave and twice differentiable utility function denoted by
U (ci, pi) . (4)
The representative citizen derives utility from consumption of private good denoted
by ci and consumption of public good denoted by pi in equation (4). Consumption
of private good can be written as a sum of the net profits of a firm, the wage income
paid to the employees and the capital income paid to the owners of the firm. Using
the earlier notation consumption can be written as
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The spesification in equation (5) contains the term r(K̄/N) which is the capital
income paid to the representative citizen. Since K̄ denotes the aggregate capital
stock in world level and N denotes the number of countries this term gives the share
of the aggregate capital income paid to the representative citizen of each country.
On the other hand, public good is financed by the capital tax. This means that
public good can be written as
pi = tiki. (6)
The government‘s objective is to maximize utility of the representative citizen.
The optimization problem can be written by replacing private consumption and
public good consumption in equation (4) with equations (5) and (6). Thus, the












The optimization problem can be solved using total differentiation. Total differen-
tiation is a way to solve the derivative of an equation in spesific cases. In this case
total differentiation is applied to solve the derivative of equation (7) with respect to




















where the chain rule is applied. This formula gives the derivative of the utility
function with respect to the capital tax rate as a sum of the derivatives of the
utility function with respect to private consumption and public good consumption










































= Up, moving the first term of the equation (9) on the right-hand side and
dividing both sides with ∂U
∂ci
(
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ki + ti ∂ki∂ti
. (11)
In order to simplify equation (11) further the right hand side of the equation can
be divided by ki and the fact that according to equation (7) ∂ki∂ti =
1
f ′′(ki) can be
recalled. After these steps equation (11) simplifies to
Up
Uc
= 11 + ti
kif ′′(ki)
. (12)
Pareto efficient production of public goods is an influential result in public eco-
nomics. Samuelson (1954) argues that public goods are Pareto efficiently produced if
the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation are equal.
In Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) framework public good production is Pareto ef-
ficient if Up
Uc
= 1. The condition for Pareto efficient public good production does not
realize in equation (12). The capital tax rate and the capital stock are both assumed
to be positive. In addition, it was derived that 1
f ′′(ki) is negative. This means that
the denominator of equation (12) is smaller than one. This implies that equation
(12) is greater than one. The condition for Pareto efficient public good production
does not hold and public good production is inefficient. The production possibility
frontier of a country shifts inward if it has to rely on capital tax only and, thus,
cause inefficiencies.
Thus, public goods are underprovided. This results originates from the fact that
due to tax competition capital tax rates are too low. In the benchmark model coun-
tries behave in a Nash manner. This means that countries choose capital tax rate
as an optimal response i.e. the one that provides the maximum welfare. Following
earlier analysis the Nash equilibrium capital tax rate of a country can be defined as
t̃ that satisfies t̃ = arg max
ti
U (ci, pi) .
Reviewing the lessons of the benchmark model of tax competition by Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) reveals two key results. Firstly, the presence of tax competition
implies that an unilateral increase in the capital tax rate of a country results in an
outflow of capital to foreign countries. Full international mobility of capital is a key
assumption behind this results. Wildasin (1989) argues that this dynamic of tax
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competition can be seen as an externality. Increasing the capital tax rate shows the
discrepancy between the perceived and true social marginal cost of public spending.
The tax revenues of other countries increase due to the inflow of capital and this
means that the discrepancy and the induced change in tax revenue are equal.
Secondly, tax competition implies underprovision of public goods in Samuelson‘s
(1954) sense. Since public goods are financed only through distortionary capital
tax governments set too low tax rates. Tax competition may lead to a race to
the bottom. Countries may compete by lowering their capital tax rates and drive
them to zero. Rota-Graziosi (2019) emphasizes the role of two properties of tax
competition game especially. First, there is the positive tax spillover which means
that if one country lowers it‘s tax rate the payoff of other countries reduces. The
opposite is true if one country increases it‘s tax rate. The second property is that
tax rates are strategic complements. This means that tax rates of different countries
enforce each others. The property confirms that with any change in tax rates other
countries will respond with similar actions.
The benchmark model consists of many identical countries. This means that the
model is modeling small open economics. Devereux and Loretz (2013) argue that the
assumption of many identical small countries is, in addition to full mobility of capital,
the key assumption of the model. They propose that due to this assumption it is
sure that the decreasing returns to capital affect the reallocation. The implications
of relaxing the key assumptions are reviewed later in this thesis.
3.1.2 Workhorse models
The benchmark model of tax competition may be the most important tax competi-
tion model. It serves as a starting point to many later models. On the other hand,
some argue that the canonical tax competition model is based on the models by
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). Keen and Konrad (2013) even
present a synthesis of these models. Wilson (1986) provides important insights to
labor and capital intensivity issues which are not present on the benchmark model.
Therefore, Wilson‘s (1986) model is briefly discussed as a workhorse model of tax
competition.
These two models are based on microeconomic framework with firm optimization
and governments maximizing utility of the representative citizen. Tax competition
literature includes workhorse models with different methodology. Gordon‘s (1986)
model serves as a starting point for many tax competition models from international
economics tradition. Mendoza and Tesar‘s (2005) model serves as a starting point
for many tax competition models from dynamic macroeconomics tradition.
The model by Wilson (1986) is built on world economy with large number of
identical countries. Firms in each country have access to production technology
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that uses capital and labor as factors of production. Both factors are fixed in world
economy level. Capital is mobile while labor is immobile. The rate of return for
capital is equal between countries. Identical households own labor. This model
departs from the benchmark model by presenting three sectors. Each country has
a national good industry denoted by subscript N , a local good industry denoted
by subscript LG and public service denoted by subscript P . National good is a
numeraire good traded in exchange for capital but local good and public service are
only locally consumed.
The objective of the government is to maximize utility of the representative
citizen. Utility of the representative citizen is presented by a utility function that
is weakly separable between consumption of private goods and public service. The
demand of the representative citizen for good of sector i is denoted by Di. Private
utility is given by a function homogeneous of degree one denoted by V (.). With
these notations utility of the representative citizen can be written as
U(V (DN , DLG), DP ). (13)
Utility given by equation (13) is maximized with respect to the budget constraint.
The endowment of capital of the representative citizen is denoted by K and the
endowment of labor is denoted by L. In addition, ρ denotes the after tax return to
capital. The budget constrain can be written as
DN + pDLG = ρK + wL. (14)
Equation (14) states that the demand for private good should be equal to the dis-
posable income of the representative citizen.
The optimal policy solves the optimization problem above. The key insight
this model provides is to describe the prerequisites of tax competition. From a
country‘s viewpoint an increase in investment due to lower capital tax rate is a
benefit associated with lower level of public service output denoted by XP . In world
level the capital stock is fixed. This implies that in foreign countries there is an
outflow of capital which equals the inflow of capital to this country. Governments
ignore this effect because they aim to improve the utility of their citizens. However,
the world level of utility is lower than it would be if every country acts this way. The
equilibrium capital stock of a country is denoted by K(ρ,Xp). The capital stock is
a function of the after tax return to capital and the public service output. It can be
stated that tax competition exists if and only if ∂K(ρ,Xp)
∂Xp
< 0. This result formally
states that an increase in the public service output causes an outflow of capital.
This is a similar condition to that of the benchmark model given by equation (3)
although the focus is on the public service output instead of the capital tax rate.
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The sign of the derivative of the equilibrium capital stock can be decomposed
to the output effect and the factor substitution effect. The output effect is studied
by considering a situation in which the public service is increased but utility of
the representative citizen is kept constant by reducing the lump sum income. Tax
rate and prices faced by the firms are kept constant. Since prices are constant
the capital-labor ratios of national and local good production remain constant. In
addition, capital-labor ratio is the same for public service production. This can be
seen from a term called public shadow price. This term is denoted by si and presents
the social cost of employing an addititional unit of factor i in production of public
service. Because policy is initially optimal it holds for public service production that
sK
sL
= MRSKL, where MRSKL denotes the marginal rate of substitution between
capital and labor. Constancy of prices means that the ratio of national and local
good is the same as before. Thus, the public service output can be increased only
by transferring labor from private good production to public service production.
The capital stock of a country requires a fall to complete this transfer without
changing the capital-labor ratios or the private consumption pattern if public service
production is labor intensive. If, on the other hand, it is capital intensive the capital








λLP =< λKP .
The substitution effect is studied by increasing public service production and
letting the capital tax rate and prices adjust. In order to finance increased public
service production the capital tax rate must increase. This changes the shadow
price ratio and, thus, capital-labor ratios. This implies that the relative price of
more capital intensive private good increases and changes the consumption pattern
towards more labor intensive private good. In order to clear the private capital
market the capital stock must fall as a result from production and consumption
becoming more labor intensive. This implies that the factor substitution effect is
always negative.
These results show that tax competition may or may not exist. If both of the
effects are negative tax competition exists. This is the case when public good pro-
duction is labor intense. On the other, hand capital intensivity of public good pro-
duction implies that these effects have different signs and tax competition does not
exist. This result means that a reduction in the public service level of every country
causes an increase in utility. If tax competition exists an increase in the capital
tax rate changes both demand and supply to labor intensive goods and production
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techniques of private firms to be more labor intensive.
The models presented so far study tax competition from microeconomic perspec-
tive and stem from the fiscal federalism tradition. The second major tradition in
tax competition literature is based on models that stem from international macroe-
conomics and public economics. This literature strand does not have as clear bench-
mark model. However, the model presented by Gordon (1986) can be seen as one of
the most important early works of this strand as Kari and Lönnqvist (2001) argue.
The model by Gordon (1986) studies international capital flows and the optimal
tax policy of small open economies using a general equilibrium framework. The
starting point is different from that of the earlier models. Unlike the earlier models
Gordon (1986) applies a two-period framework in which each small open economy
contains a representative citizen and one freely tradeable good. In the first period
the representative citizen is given a wealth endowment denoted by Yj which she
can spent on the first period consumption denoted by Cj1 or invest. The net-of-
tax return on investment is denoted by qj. Government produces public service
denoted by Gj in the first period and finances them by debt. Debt is paid from the
tax revenue in the second period. The representative citizen works Lj hours in the
second period and earns a before-tax wage denoted by wj. Labor income is taxed
with a rate denoted by sj.
Production happens only in the second period when firms produce using pro-
duction technology described by f (Kj, Lj) with fK > 0 and fKK < 0. Corporate
income is taxed corporate income tax denoted by τj. Therefore, the after tax profit
can be written as
(1− τj) (f (Kj, Lj)− wjLj) +Kj.
Representative citizen maximizes utility which is a function of consumption of both
periods, disutility of labor and utility from public service. The utility can formally
be written as
U (Cj1, Cj2, Lj) + U∗ (Gj) . (15)
Equation (15) is maximized subject to the budget constraint following the descrip-
tions above and given as
Cj2 = (1− sj)wjLj + (1 + qj) (Yj − Cj1) . (16)
The government, however, chooses the optimal policy by maximizing the represen-
tative citizen‘s utility subject to the aggregate resource constrant given as
C2 + (1 + i (π))G+ (1 + pc)K
≤ f (K,L) +K + (Y − C1) (1 + p (t)) , (17)
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where i (π) is the domestic inflation rate, p (t) is the return from the best available
asset, pc is the cost of finance for domestic corporations given the means of finance
they choose. Government chooses the values for wn, t, g,K, π and allows G to ad-
just. Solving the optimization problem yields that the optimal corporate tax rate is
zero. This is because labor taxation is available and capital supply from abroad is
infinitely elastic. This means that labor bears all the tax burden. In addition, the
labor income tax dominates the corporate tax because the corporate tax reduces
capital investment causing an additional distortion. Whereas the earlier models ap-
ply a more general capital taxation Gordon (1986) applies capital taxation that is
spesificly corporate income taxation.
The third strand of tax competition literature applies modern macroeconomics
models. This strand has many issues in common with the tradition that stems from
international economics and public economics. However, this strand has an own
workhorse model. The model by Mendoza and Tesar (2005) is a neoclassical growth
model. The model is calibrated to European data. The strand of literature that
stems from modern macroeconomics brings a new feature to tax competition theory
since it includes calibration of the models as a part of the analysis.
This model builds on a two-country framework in which governments are al-
lowed to meet once to play a tax competition game. In this game they choose the
time-invariant tax rate on capital. There is a payoff for each country for each tax
strategy. The payoff corresponds to the welfare gain or the welfare loss that each
country makes at competitive equilibrium to satisfy the government constraints.
Three externalities are presented in order to illustrate the features of tax competi-
tion. The relative price externality states that countries attempt to affect the terms
of trade or the interest rate via tax policy. The wealth-redistribution externality is
such that taxation affects the accumulation of the factors of production. The tax
cuts can, thus, be a means to attract mobile factors. The fiscal solvency externality
is a result of the two mentioned ones.
The utility of representative household is given by an isoelastic lifetime utility
function as









where subscribt t denotes time index, ct is consumption, lt is leisure, β is household‘s
subjective discount factor (0 < β < 1), 1
σ
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion in consumption (σ > 1) and a governs the intertemporal elasticity of labor
supply for a given value of σ (a > 0). The sequence of periodic budget constrains is
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given as












= (1− τL)wtLt + (1− τK) (rt − δ) kt + bt + dt + et, (19)
where τC denotes the consumption tax, τLdenotes the labor income tax, τK denotes
the capital income tax, bt denotes the private international bonds, dt denotes the
domestic government bonds, δ denotes the rate of depreciation of the capital stock,
xt denotes net invetments, wt denotes the labor wage rate, rt denotes the capital
factor payment rate, qgt and qt denote the prices for the government bonds and the
private bonds respectively, η determines the speed of adjustment of capital stock and
z is the long run investment-capital ratio. There is also no-Ponzi condition10. Firms
have access to Cobb-Douglas production tehcnology and the government budget
constraint is given as
(gt + et) = τCct + τLwtLt + τK (rt − δ) kt + (1 + γ) qgt dt+1. (20)
This model builds a more complex model economy than the models mentioned
earlier. Mendoza and Tesar (2005) calibrate the model for European data and
are able to derive tax rates that are similar to the ones observed. They argue
that the tax rates observed are a result of tax competition in which tax revenue
externality triggers changes in labor taxation. Thus, the changes tax competition
causes are adjusted by labor taxation. If, however, consumption taxes are assumed
to be adjusting race to the bottom would occur. This would benefit the countries
since distorting capital taxation would be replaced with consumption taxes.
3.2 Relaxing the key assumptions of the benchmark model
The benchmark model as well as workhorse models use several assumptions. De-
vereux and Loretz (2013) argue that full mobility of capital and symmetricality of
countries are the key assumptions of the benchmark model. In addition, one es-
pecially important assumption is that in the benchmark model public goods are
financed through capital taxation only. The benchmark model implicitly assumes
that all industries have the same tax treatment. In addition, the benchmark model
does not identify the nature of public goods.
There are many assumptions that may affect the implications of tax competition.
This subchapter studies the implications of relaxing the key assumptions of the
benchmark model. Most of the presented models use the benchmark model as
10The no-Ponzi condition is common in modern macroeconomics models. It restricts the agents
from paying debt with new higher debt forever.
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their starting point but some models use different strategy. This is because some
institutional layers may be hard to introduce to the framework of the benchmark
model.
3.2.1 Imperfect mobility of capital
One of the key assumption of the canonical tax competition model is that capital
is fully mobile between countries. This assumption, however, is not fully in line
with international capital movements. Mobility of capital has increased but capital
movements are costly since, for example, there are transaction costs. The role of
imperfect mobility of capital in tax competition is studied by Lee (1997) who applies
a two-period two-country framework building on the benchmark model.
This model assumes that capital is fully mobile in the first period but a transac-
tion cost is required in the second period if capital is moved between regions. Usually
the net return on capital equals the marginal product minus the tax rate such that
in equilibrium equation (2) holds. Since transaction costs are required in the second
period capital must have higher return in the jurisdiction it relocates in. Otherwise,
there would be no incentive to relocate. This implies that capital can only move
from one country to another but not from both countries. The jurisdiction that
serves as the destination for the relocation of capital must pay higher return to it.
Thus, capital moves only when a critical value of transaction cost is crossed.
If transaction costs are greater than the critical values capital will not move.
This implies that tax competition is even more aggressive in the first period but
that in the second period there is overprovision of public goods. Tax competition
becomes even more aggressive because capital only moves during the first period.
On the other hand, since capital does not move in the second period countries can
set even too high tax rates.On the other hand, the results differ if transaction costs
are smaller than the critical values. In this case capital moves in both periods and
underprovision of public goods may result.
3.2.2 Asymmetric countries
In the benchmark model countries are identical. However, countries differ with re-
spect to their population, for example. Bucovetsky (1991) presents a two-country
tax competition model in which countries differ in population size. The model is
based on the benchmark model. However, this model assumes only two countries
such that the share of country i‘s population of the world population is denoted
with si. The first country is assumed to have a greater or equal share of the world
population than the second country such that s1 ≥ s2. When the number of ju-
risdictions is small the net return on capital given by equation (2) is affected by
changes in public goods provision. If one of the countries chooses to increase public
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good provision the net return to capital decreases. However, citizens have a positive
supply for it.
The underprovision incentive is especially strong if the country is a net exporter
of capital. This effect is not present if countries are small in the sense that they
cannot affect the world net return to capital. Another interesting feature of this
model is that it is shown that smaller country sets lower tax rates. This result is
obtained assuming quadratic production function defined as f (ki) = (a− bki) ki,
where a and b are parameters. In addition, it is proved that with this equilibrium
citizen‘s of the smaller country have higher utility than those in the bigger country.
The dynamic behind this result is that the revenue effects are more critical for the
smaller country and, thus, it favors to set lower tax rate.
Another tax competition model with asymmetric countries is provided by Wilson
(1991). In this two-country model governments can buy one unit of private good and
turn it into one unit public good. The maximization problem implies a condition in
which public goods are underprovided if tax rates satify t1 > t2. On the other hand,
they result in a proposition where u1 ≷ u2 as t1 ≶ t2. This model, thus, provides
more general conditions under which smaller countries set lower tax rates and have
higher utility.
A more recent model of asymmetrical countries is provided by Pieretti and
Skerdilajda (2011). This model includes two countries with different sized popula-
tions. Public goods are seen in a broad manner including, for example, infrastructure
and services. Public goods may, thus, enhance the productivity of firms. Therefore,
firms are also attracted by public goods and they the make location decisions based
on both the tax rate differentials and public goods levels. Tax competition is mod-
eled through a game in which governments first choose the level of public good and
then set tax rate to maximize their rents. Mobility costs of firms are in a key role
for the results. If mobility costs are very low larger country can only attract capital
by offering higher levels of public goods than the smaller country. On the other
hand, with intermediate mobility costs the smaller country can attract firms with
high public good supply but without lowering it‘s tax rate.
The result that smaller countries set lower tax rates is questioned by Lai (2014)
who introduces lobbying to asymmetric tax competition framework. Citizens are
divided to capitalists and workers. It is assumed that capitalist build a lobbying
organization to affect the tax rate. In this model labor taxation is present and the
lobbying organization is able to shift most of the tax burden to workers. This means
that there is less pressure to decrease the capital tax rate. This only holds for the
smaller country because it is assumed to be a small open economy which cannot
effect the net rate of return on capital. Capitalist adjust to higher tax rate. They
can use domestic public goods but the true tax burden is shifted to workers.
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The nature of tax competition between developed and developing countries is
also studied. Mardan and Stimmelmayer (2020) present a model in which countries
difffer with respect to country spesific risk. Based on a two-country framework
with a multinational corporation they argue that profit shifting possibilities of the
multinational corporations crucially affect the optimal tax rates of the two countries.
Their results suggest that compared to lower-risk countries higher-risk countries may
set lower tax rate if profit shifting is costly and higher tax rate if profit shifting is
less costly. Thus, tax competition works differently for developed and developing
countries. In developing countries governments do not have efficient tools to limit
profit shifting and tax rates are set higher. On the other hand, with low costs of
profit shifting governments of the developed countries must respond via lower tax
rates since otherwise profit shifting increases.
3.2.3 Role of the government‘s budget in tax competition
Public goods are not speficly defined in the benchmark model. Public goods can be,
for example, transfers or infrastructure investment. Infrastructure investment can
be thought as an example of a case in which public inputs are applied to produce
private good. When governments provide infrastructure firms use it as part of their
production. The benchmark model is extended to study public inputs by writing
production function as f (ki, bi), where bi is the level of public goods that is provided
to firms. The government budget constraint is written as tiki = pi + bi, where pi is
public goods other than those provided to firms. Solving the optimization problem
using similar steps than in chapter 3.1.1 implies that public goods are underprovided.
The fact that firms use public good as a part of their production does not change
the dynamics of the model.
The composition of government‘s budget is further studied by Keen and Marc-
hand (1997). Again, public goods are used as an input in private production. The
production function in their model is defined as f (ki, li, bi) , where the output comes
from a process using capital denoted by ki, labour denoted by li and public input
denoted by bi. This model departs from the benchmark model by modeling labor
in a different manner. Wage tax denoted by τi is set as is capital tax denoted by ti
. With these definitions the private budget constraint can be written as
ci = (wi − τi) li + (1− ti)R + pk̄, (21)
where wi is the wage rate, li is the labor supply, R is return to capital and k̄ is the
world capital stock. Both rents and capital are taxed in this model. Capital tax is
denoted by T . The government constraint can be written as
pi + bi = τili + Tk + tR. (22)
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Equations (21) and (22) can be plugged in the utility function defined as
U (ci − a(li), pi) ,
where a (.) is the real disutility related to labor supply li and pi is public good
provision.
Solving the optimization problem as earlier yields that public goods are under-
provided. However, the contribution of this model is to show that tax competition
causes inefficiences to the composition of public goods. Public inputs may end up
relatively overprovided and consumption related items may end up underprovided.
Because firms use public goods in their production governments may try to attract
firms by overproviding public inputs. Other parts of the budget may, therefore, end
up relatively underprovided.
In addition to budget composition the role of the budget can be modeled through
spillovers. Certain government policies such as climate protection may have spillover
effects. This means that the effect of a policy spills to other countries. Bjorvatn
and Schjelderup (2002) present a model that includes spillovers. Their idea is to
include spillover effects to the utility function as a part of the public good con-
sumption. The basic model stems from the benchmark model. They present the
public good consumption as pi = pi + β
∑
ji
pj, where pi denotes the domestic public
good consumption and the second term is the spillover effects. Spefically β ∈ [0, 1]
measures how does the public good consumption in region j spillovers to region i.
With the spesification in which β = 0 there are no spillovers. With the spesification
in which β = 1 there are perfect spillovers. In practise the no spillovers case means
purely national public good and the perfect spillovers case means purely interna-
tional public good. Solving the optimization problem yields that public goods are
underprovided for imperfect spillovers. For perfect spillovers, however, public goods
are optimally provided. With full spillovers the gain of attracting capital is offset
by the international loss of public goods.
3.2.4 Broadening the financing base of public goods
Public goods are financed by capital tax in the benchmark model. Later research
broadens the financing base of public goods. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) present
tax competition model with income tax. This model builds on two-period frame-
work in which governments choose the tax rate they commit to in the first period.
Production happens in the second period when individuals decide how much labor
to supply and how much to save. Tax collection and public good production happen
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in the second period. Optimization problem can be written as
max
c1,c2,n
U (v(c1, c2, l), p) s.t.
c2 = (1 + p)(e− c1) + wl.
Utility builds on the private utility function v(c1, c2, l), where there is the first and
the second period consumption and labor supply in the second period. In addition,
public good consumption is on the utility function. The budget constraint states
that the second period consumption should equal the wage income and the income
from the endowment. In the budget constraint p is the after-tax domestic interest
rate, w is the after-tax wage rate and e is the initial resource endowment. In addition
taxes are defined as t = r − R and T = w − ω. The first equation states that the
source-based capital tax rate is the wedge between the cost of capital on return on
capital. The second equation states that wage tax is the wedge between product of
labor and wage rate.
The government‘s problem is to maximize utility of the representative citizen.
Public good consumption and taxes are the constraints. This model implies that
both wage income tax and capital tax rates are positivive. However, public goods
are still underprovided. In addition, tax rates of capital relative to labor are ineffi-
ciently low. It is argued that underprovision in this scenario results because there
is no residence-based taxation available. As usual it is assumed that only source-
based taxation is available. However, the lack of residence-based taxation causes
the outflow effect of capital in this model.
Tax competition models often consider a situation in which capital or corporate
tax rate is the only tax instrument. Studying the structure of corporate tax systems
reveals that tax base is also an important tax instrument when considering the total
corporate tax burden. Devereux et al. (2002) show that although the statutory
corporate tax rates have declined starting from the 1980s the effective tax rates
have not declined as rapidly since corporate tax base has been widened. Haufler
and Schelderup (2000) consider a situation in which government can choose both
the corporate income tax rate and the tax base.
This model builds on a two-country and two-period framework. Firms use capital
as the only factor of production and have access to production technology described
by a production function f (ki). The user cost of capital is denoted by rki and
capital depreciation is denoted by δki. With this notation the gross profits in each
country are defined as
f (ki)− (r + δ) ki. (23)
Equation (23) can be rewritten allowing tax deductibility parameter to enter. Tax
deductibility parameter is denoted by αi. It can vary across countries. The corporate
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tax base in a country can be written as
f (ki)− αi (r + δ) ki. (24)
This definition has interesting implications. If αi < 1 government also taxies invest-
ments. If αi = 1 government only taxes pure profits. This is the definition in use in
many tax competition model. If αi > 1 government subsidies investments.
Applying equations (23) and (24) and denoting the tax rate by ti the net after-tax
profits can be written as
πi = f (ki)− (r + δ) ki − ti [f (ki)− αi (r + δ) ki]
= (1− ti) (f (ki)− (r + δ) ki)− (1− αi) ti (r + δ) ki. (25)
The optimization problem of an individual is to maximize utility subject to the
intertemporal budget constraint. Each individual receives an exogenous endowment
denoted by ei in the first period. She can either consume or invest it. Savings are
denoted as (c1i − ei). The entrepreneur in country i owns a share of a firm denoted
by si in both countries. Since investment earn return denoted by r we can write the
intertemporal budget constraint of a citizen in country as





This model departs from the canonical tax competition model in multiple levels
one of which is that a fixed revenue requirement is presented. This means that when
choosing the right tax rate and the tax base or the tax system denoted by (ti, αi) gov-
ernment has to collect an exogenously given amount of tax revenue Ri > 0 through
corporate taxation. This constraint can be seen as a political constraint. Govern-
ment maximizes indirect utility function denoted by Vi (ti, αi) subject to revenue
requirement. Government‘s problem can, thus, be written as
L = Vi (ti, αi) + µi [tiTi −Ri] . (27)
Solving the optimization problem shows that with no foreign direct investment it
is optimal to allow full deduction of investment expenditure. This does not disturb
the investment behavior of the firms. In addition, it is optimal to set tax rate such
that the revenue satisfies the budget. When foreign direct investment is introduced
it becomes optimal not to allow full deduction of investment expenditures and, in
turn, lower the corporate tax rates to reduce profit shifting. This mechanism helps
to correct the distortion caused by corporate taxation. Disturbing the investment
behavior allows to set lower level of corporate taxation and reduces profit shifting.
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Many tax competition models assume that public sector is financed through tax
revenue only. Jensen and Toma (1991) extend this assumption by allowing debt to
be a financing mechanism. They build two-country and two-period model in which
public spending is financed through tax revenue of the current period and debt.
Model economy has the representative citizen and a homogeneous numeraire private
good is produced via production function given by f (kit) where i = 1, 2 denotes
country and t = 1, 2 denotes time period.
Government financing differs in periods one and two. In the first period govern-
ment is financed through tax revenue collected in the first period and government
bonds denoted with di. In the second period tax revenue is collected and govern-
ments must pay back the debt. Governments must pay an interest denoted by r∗
from the debt. With this notation the government budget constraints for the two
periods can be written as
pi1 = ti1ki1 + di
pg = ti2ki2 − (1 + r∗) di. (28)
Utility function can be written as
Ui (xit, pit) = U (xit + h (pit)) ,
where xit is the private consumption. For private consumption there are also two
budget constraints. In addition, h′ (0) > 1, h′ > 0 and h′′ < 0. In the first period
private consumption is the net income less the purchases of governments bonds
denoted by si. In the second period private consumption is the net income plus
income from the government bonds. The net income is the factor income plus the
capital income. The share of capital in jurisdiction i is denoted by θi. With these
notations the net income and the budget constraints for the two periods can be
written as
yit = fi (kit)− f ′i (kit) kit + θiptK,
xi1 = yi1 − si,
xi2 = yi2 + (1 + r) si. (29)
The optimization problem follows the canonical tax competition literature by
assuming that governments maximize utility of the representative citizen. This is
done by choosing the tax rate and the level of debt in the first period and the tax
rate in the second period. Government spending is assumed to adjust to the chosen
tax rate and debt level. Total utility can, thus, be written as sum of utilities of the
two periods and can be witten as
Wi = Ui (yi1 − si, ti1ki1 + di) + Ui (yi2 + (1 + r∗) si, ti2ki2 − (1 + r) di) . (30)
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Optimization problem is solved by considering first the second period problem and
then the first period problem. The insteresting results of his model imply that gov-
ernments do not choose to balance periodic budgets when issuing debt is available.
This brokens the connection between tax rates and public good provision. This is
because in this model high taxes do not mean higher level of public goods. Paying
the debt in the second period means that the second period tax rate is high. At the
same time public good provision is low because debt has to be paid.
3.2.5 Preferential treatment
In the benchmark model all asset types and industries face the same tax treatment.
Governments may, however, try to attract certain kind of firms by allowing them
different tax treatment. Janeba and Smart (2001) note that preferential treatment
can occur in multiple ways. In addition to allowing different corporate tax rate to
different firms or industries governments may allow selective investment tax credits
or tax holidays to some firms.
Janeba and Smart (2001) study the implications of preferential treatment in
a two-country and two tax base model. Instead of competing over one tax base
countries compete over two. Governments have different objectives than in the
benchmark model. Instead of utility maximization it is assumed that home and
foreign country both have two tax bases and governments maximize the joint tax
revenue11. The effects of preferential treatment on tax revenue play an important
part in this model.
Analysis starts from a situation in which the two governments agree to restrict
the preferential treatment regimes. The effect of restriction can be decomposed to
the base effect and the strategic effect. Posing restrictions on preferential treatment
increases tax revenues through the base effect. Strategic effect presents the impact
on the intensity of tax competition. Whether total tax revenue falls or increases
after posing a restriction depends on the relative magnitude of these effects. The
results suggest that restricting preferential treatment may in some cases be desirable.
Restricting preferential treatment is desirable if the tax base with lower tax rate is
more mobile than the tax base with higher rate. It may even be that if the bases
respond to changes in a similar way restriction cause an increase in tax revenue.
However, if the bases do not respond to changes restriction reduces tax revenues.
The key driver behind these results is the elasticity of tax base with respect to a
coordinated tax changes.
A more positive view on preferential treatment is provided by Keen (2001) who
argues that preferential treatment may make tax competition less harmful. In this
11This type of goverment is know as Leviathan goverment. Description of Leviathan governments
and tax competition can be found from chapter 4.6.
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two-country two tax base model governments are assumed to maximize tax rev-
enue. The implications of preferential treatment are studied by solving the Nash
equilibrium tax rates and revenues of unconstrained and constrained regimes and
comparing them. It is shown that the tax revenue decreases if countries are pre-
vented from offering preferential treatment. Allowing preferential treatment means
that countries can restrict tax competition to concern only a part of the tax system.
Without preferential treatment countries would compete with all tax system.
Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007) extend the analysis of Keen (2001) by adding
asymmetries between countries to the model. The populations are different sized
in the countries. The share of the country i population of the total population is
denoted by si. It is assumed sA ≤ 0.5 and sB ≥ 0.5. The implications are similar to
the ones above although asymmetry is presented. Not allowing preferential treat-
ment will lower the average tax rate. This means that tax competition becomes
more aggressive than it would with preferential treatment. If governments are pre-
vented to compete through spesific tax bases they will compete through the overall
level of taxation.
3.3 Discussion on the canonical tax competition model
The focus on this chapter is mostly on the benchmark model of tax competition.
The model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) is fruitful in analysis and widely
applied in later literature. It is shown that tax competition leads to underprovision
of public goods. Competitive pressures drive tax rates to inefficiently low levels and
public goods are not efficiently produced. In addition, it is shown that this result is
strong. Underprovision result often holds although the key assumptions are relaxed.
According to the benchmark model it is possible that tax competition causes race
to the bottom. This means that tax competition drives tax rates to zero. However,
although the corporate tax rates have declined they are far from zero as are the
corporate tax revenues (Devereux et al. 2002; OECD 2019). It is possible that there
is no race to the bottom. Many issues may explain this trend. It may be that tax
bases have been broadened (Loretz and Notes 2008), economic activity has risen
(Huber et al. 2020) or that the distribution between labor and capital income has
changed for capital.
On the other hand, it is possible that race to the bottom takes more time than
thought. Corporate tax rates have lowered also in the 2000s. This development can
be seen as a sign that race to the bottom is happening all the time. However, the
convergence of corporate tax rates to zero or near zero may take several decades or
longer. Tax competition started at mid 1900s or at latest in the 1980s so it is a
relatively new phenomenon. Therefore, it is natural that tax rates are still above
zero although race to the bottom would occur.
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The workhorse models of tax competition provide important insights to the dy-
namics of tax competition. Wilson (1986) argues that tax competition exists if
public service production is labor intense. In this case an increase in capital tax
rates changes both demand and supply to labor intensive goods as well as produc-
tion techniques to more labor intense one. Gordon (1986) argues that the optimal
capital tax rate is zero. Mendoza and Tesar (2005) are able to build a model that
yields corporate tax rates similar to those actually observed.
The implications of these models are quite different. One argues that corporate
tax rate should be zero whereas the other derives positive tax rates. The benchmark
model implies that there may be race to the bottom. The modelling methodologies
differ as well do the research questions. These may explain at least part of the
differences. On the other hand, although these implications differ quantitatively
they are similar qualitatively. All models include an idea of tax competition which
reduces tax rates or an idea that tax rates should decrease.
The title of this chapter is the canonical tax competition model. Earlier dis-
cussion does not, however, define what canonical means. Instead Zodrow and
Mieszkowski‘s (1986) model is referred as the benchmark model and other presented
models are called workhorse models. In this context canonical means an abstraction
of the benchmark and workhorse models. All these models are important part of
theories of tax competition. Because tradition of tax competition is wide canonical-
ity cannot be presented by a single model. The canonical tax competition model is,
in fact, more an idea than a model.
This view of canonicality differs from the earlier literature. Often in tax com-
petition literature the canonical tax competition model is used to describe Zodrow
and Mieszkowski‘s (1986) and Wilson‘s (1986) models or a synthesis of them. This
view is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, later models often only use Zodrow
and Mieszkowski‘s (1986) model as a starting point. Therefore, if canonicality refers
to an actual model it should refer only to the model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986).
Secondly, the definition in which canonicality refers only to the models mentioned
above cannot take into account the diversity of theories of tax competition. Although
microeconomic modelling approach is very important in tax competition literature
there are important macroeconomic modelling traditions. These traditions and their
division are briefly discussed in this chapter. The division between traditions is based
on views from the history of economic thought of tax competition.
Because earlier definition of the canonical tax competition model cannot reach
these issues this thesis proposes a new definition for canonicality. Instead of viewing
canonicality in a way in which it refers to the models by Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986) it should be viewed referring to the ideas of theories of
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tax competition presented by different traditions. In this definition canonicality is
presented through the history of economic thought of tax competition and the most
important models of these strands.
It is acknowledged that the definition based on the history of ideas leaves the
canonical tax competition model hard to reach. Defining the canonical tax competi-
tion model this way does not allow to further define it by important assumptions, for
example. This, in turn, is because this definition introduces very different models as
part of the canonical tax competition model. Although the definition of the canon-
ical tax competition model is somewhat abstract and hard to reach it is important
to emphasize role of the benchmark model. Many of the later studies use this model
as their starting point.
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4 Further perspectives to theories of tax compe-
tition
The previous chapter focused on presenting the benchmark model, other workhorse
models and discussing how does relaxing the key assumptions of the benchmark
model affect the implications of tax competition. Although the canonical tax com-
petition model is very useful and able to present important implications of tax
competition it cannot include some important aspects of tax competition. This
chapter provides further perspectives to theories of tax competition.
This chapter broadens the analysis of theories of tax competition in two ways.
Firstly, issues that are not a part of the canonical tax competition model are included
to tax competition framework. This chapter discusses, for example, the effects of
labor markets and foreign direct investments on tax competition. Secondly, this
chapter further broadens the methodological views on theories of tax competition.
Some models present new modelling methodologies such as overlapping generations
models. Some models further develop the methodologies mentioned earlier.
The underprovision of public goods is a strong result of the benchmark model.
This result is also a part of many of the models that use the benchmark model
as a starting point. However, many of the models presented in this chapter do not
study the possibility of underprovision of public goods. Instead the focus is on other
issues. For example, it is interesting to study how countries set their tax rates in
tax competition when new institutional layers are added to the model economy.
4.1 Further perspectives on competition, trade and asym-
metries
This subchapter broadens the discussion of chapter 3.2 about relaxing the key as-
sumptions of the benchmark model. Assumptions that are related to trade and
competition are reviewed. In addition, the analysis of asymmetries is further devel-
oped.
4.1.1 International trade
The idea of tax competition literature is to model the effects of a situation in which
firms have the possibility to locate in different countries. However, most of the early
tax competition models do not model international trade. Wilson (1987) models
international trade and tax competition. This model is based on a multi-country
framework in which economies produce two private goods one of which is more
capital intense than the other. Governments use private good as the only input in
public good production.
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The important implication of this model is that all countries end up producing
only one good. In a situation with two industries the changes in the tax rate of a
country end up moving the second industry‘s factor-price frontier toward a higher
wage rate. This means that industry is left with zero profits. One of the indus-
tries will exit the country. Although countries are identical different tax rates and
different produced goods are chosen. The equilibrium is characterized by wasteful
diversity since it would be Pareto optimal to choose same consumption bundles when
countries are identical.
Tax competition model with commodity trade and trade protection is presented
by Janeba and Wilson (1999). In this model countries are characterized by two
industries that produce different goods with different factors of production. Whereas
the first industry uses labor and land the second industry uses labor and capital.
Trade protection is modeled by assuming that governments can choose tariff rates.
Governments choose tax rates and tax revenue is returned to citizen as subsidy.
Governments maximize representative citizen‘s utility which is derived from the two
goods.
Governments with lower capital tax rates set lower tariffs. This means that
governments may respond to tax competition by reducing trade protection. Without
tariffs tax rates may end up to an inefficiently high level but presenting optimal tariffs
drives tax rates to inefficiently low level. Less protectionist policies may mean that
tax competition is good from the efficiency perspective in international level. On
the other hand, the welfare effects of tax competition are dependent on the state of
the international developments in trade protection.
4.1.2 Imperfect competition
In the canonical tax competition model firms operate in perfect competition. This
means that markets include many producers such that one firm cannot affect, for
example, prices. However, many industries have structure that supports the idea
of imperfect competition. Instead of many firms there may be only few firms or in
the extreme monopoly case just one firm. Janeba (1998) presents a tax competition
model in which output markets are based on imperfect competition.
The model applies a duopoly framework. There are two firms one of which
is located in the home country while the other is located in the foreign country.
Firms produce a homogeneous good which is sold in a third country. There is no
consumption in home and foreign countries. Firms choose their location based on
the tax rate differentials. The objective of governments is to maximize the net
surplus which means the producer surplus plus the tax revenue.
Governments can attract both firms by slightly undercutting the other country‘s
tax rates. Governments, however, benefit from this undercutting only when tax rates
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are positive and there are no subsidies. If taxes are negative governments will slitghly
overcut other country‘s subsidy. Therefore, tax rates are set to zero. In international
trade literature imperfect competition may lead to subsidy competition. When
tax competition is present and capital is mobile there is no possibility of subsidy
competition.
4.1.3 Market power
The benchmark model as well as most workhorse models model small open economies.
Countries do not have the possibility to affect prices or the dynamics of the markets.
This changes if countries are assumed to possess market power. Hoyt (1991) studies
market power by presenting a model which is build on the framework of the bench-
mark model. Market power is introduced to the model by reducing the number of
countries which is analogous to increasing the market power of a single country.
The starting point of the analysis is a situation with no market power. Reduc-
ing the number of countries and, thus, increasing the market power of countries
implies that tax rates increase. This results because reducing the number of coun-
tries reduces the tax competition externality presented in the previous chapter by
internalizing the externality. In addition to tax rates utility increases as a result of
marker power. Thus, increasing market power of a country reduces tax competition
and increases tax rates and utility.
The market power of countries may appear if some industry is concentrated in a
country. If this is the case taxation of mobile capital captures monopoly rents. Gov-
ernments may, thus, be able to exploit the market power and this way mitigate the
inefficiencies of tax competition. This idea is presented by Noiset (2003). However,
it remains unclear whether the equilibrium is characterized with underprovision,
overprovision or efficient provision of public goods.
4.1.4 Agglomeration
In the benchmark model all countries have equal oppotunities to attract firms. How-
ever, some countries may possess agglomerative forces which allows them to maintain
higher tax rates and attract or maintain the firms. Country may, for example, have
a high quality education system which attracts firms. Some industries may start to
concentrate (agglomerate) in the countries. These countries may become the core
areas of economies.
Agglomerative forces and tax competition is studied by Baldwin and Krugman
(2004). This model is based on a two-country framework in which one of the coun-
tries is rich while the other one is poor. The rich country presents the core of the
world economy. The results of the model state that the core area has higher tax
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rate than the periphery. This is because the core area can capture agglomeration
rents since firms are willing to locate in it for other reasons than taxation.
In addition, it is argued that due to agglomerative forces tax competition is one
sided. The tax rate setting of the core is bounded by the tax rate setting of the
periphery but the same does not hold other way around. The periphery knows that
it cannot attract core and can set the tax rate purely on domestic purposes. The
core, on the other hand, cannot higher it‘s tax rate without a bound. It can capture
agglomeration rents only to a certain boundary.
Firms may have different productivities and this may affect both tax competition
and agglomeration. Heterogenous firms and agglomeration are studied by Baldwin
and Okubo (2014). In this model larger firms are more productive and more sensitive
to tax rates. There is a larger and a smaller country first of which sets higher tax rate.
Larger and more productive firms are important in tax competition and lowering the
corporate tax rate may attract more productive firms to the country and improve
the aggregate productivity.
Governments may commit to perform certain policies. Commitment is a way
to communicate firms, for example, that certain policy is going to happen. Kato
(2015) studies commitment and agglomeration in tax competition context. In this
two-country framework commitment implies that there is a core-periphery set-up.
In presence of agglomerative behavior governments should subsidy firms in order
to prevent concentration on one country. Subsidying is, however, costly. Although
both governments wish to be the core it is better to be the periphery than one of the
countries in a situation in which firms are divided to two countries. This is because
periphery country does not need to subsidize firms.
4.2 Vertical and spatial tax competition
Different governance structures are not taken into consideration in the canonical
tax competition model. Some countries may, for example, be centrally governed
whereas the others may be decentrally governed. In addition to federal government
there may be regional or local governments. Many models of tax competition as-
sume horisontal tax competition in which governments of the same horizontal level
compete. In vertical tax competition different levels of governments compete. Spa-
tial tax competition which studies metropoly areas, for example, is another way of
add a new layer to institutional to framework to study tax competition.
The interaction between horizontal and vertical tax competition is studied by
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004). They model an economy that consist of one federal
and many regional governments. This division changes the externalities of tax com-
petition. The horizontal externality is similar to the one presented before and drives
federal taxes to be too low. The vertical externality is regional level externality hav-
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ing the opposite effect. The interesting implication of the model is that no matter
which one of the externalities dominates intensifying of tax competition reduces
welfare. If the horizontal externality dominates intesifying regional tax competition
drives tax rates even further inefficiently low. If the vertical externality dominates
it drives tax rates even further inefficiently high.
This analysis is supplemented by Wilson and Janeba (2005) who model a world
economy consisting of two federal governments that are both divided to many iden-
tical regions. Public good provision can happen either by federal or regional govern-
ments. The supply is, however, different in federal and regional levels. In this set-up
countries choose to decentralize. This means that they provide part of the public
good in regional level. Decentralization is welfare improving. International tax
competition causes welfare losses but decentralization can partly offset these losses.
Decentralization creates vertical externalities such that the tax rates in regional level
would rise in order to offset the lowering in the federal level. This result, however,
only applies to upward sloping tax reaction curves. With downward sloping tax
reaction curves decentralization is welfare worsening. With downward sloping tax
reaction curves countries end up reducing their combined tax rates. This increases
underprovision of public goods.
Spillovers in vertical tax competition framework are studied by Armbruster and
Hintermann (2020). This model consist of federal and regional governments such
that the regional governments collect taxes and provide public good. The spillover
effect is modeled as in the chapter 3.2.3. In addition, a federal transfer system is
added to the model. The inefficiency created by tax competition is limited due
to the spillover but, on the other hand, it leads to a free-riding problem. Federal
governments may commit to a certain policy but since they care about the welfare
of the citizens in different areas they may be unable to live up to this commitment.
Thus, regions may anticipate that governments redistribute. This means that some
regions may be willing to lower their tax rates because they anticipate redistribution
and spillovers.
A spatial tax competition model is presented by Braid (2000). This model consid-
ers a world economy which consists of many metropolitan areas. The metropolitan
areas consists of two local jurisdictions each. This model incorporates a lump-sum
tax, an income tax and a corporate tax. When the lump-sum tax is available the
jurisdictions choose to use that and not to use other taxes. In this case public good
provision is efficient. On the other hand, only business tax being available results
in undersupply of public goods. These are very similar results to the benchmark
model. It is interesting that if both income and business tax are available jurisdic-
tions choose only income tax which also results in underprovision of public goods.
One of the key drivers of underprovision result in this model is surprisingly commut-
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ing for work between jurisdictions. In fact, a decrease in commuting costs included
in the model worsens the underprovision result. If it is cheaper to commute for
work to other areas the result might be that home areas public service levels be-
gin to decline. On the other hand, low levels of commuting costs imply that local
governments have greater incentives not to increase the level of taxation.
4.3 Labor markets and income distribution
Many tax competition models do not explicitly model labor markets. Adding labor
markets to tax competition framework provides important insights on tax com-
petition. Ogawa et al. (2006) present an extension of the benchmark model with
exogenously fixed wages. Utility is obtained from consumption of private and public
goods. Citizens are either full time employed or unemployed. Employed individuals
get income from wages denoted by w, capital income denoted by pλk and dividends
denoted by π and they have to pay a head tax denoted by h. Unemployed individ-
uals have otherwise similar constraint but they do not get wages. Thus, the budget
constraints for employed and unemployed can be written as
xj =
 w + π + pλk − h if i = e = employed,π + pλk − h if i = u = unemployed. (31)
Public goods are financed through capital taxation and a head tax. Governments
maximize the weighted welfare of employed and unemployed.
In this model factors of production are capital and labor. If capital and labor
are not related in production such that flk = 0 the capital tax is set on zero rate.
However, if capital and labor are complementary such that flk > 0 countries set
negative tax rates and thus subsidy firms. This is because attracting firms has a
positive effect on employment in the case of complementary factors of production.
Positive tax rates are set if flk < 0 in which case attracting capital has negative
effect on employment. Underprovision may occur in the first two cases. In the third
case tax rates may end up inefficiently high. These results are driven by the fiscal
and the unemployment externalities. The first one is similar to the externality of
the benchmark model. The unemployment externality states that the choices of tax
rates affect the employment status of citizens. This effect is, however, ignored in
decision making.12
The results of Ogawa et al. (2006) are extended by Eichner and Upmann (2012).
They use similar model as Ogawa et al. (2006) but define that citizens obtain utility
from leisure time also and include an unemployment benefit. Citizens are either full
time employed or unemployed. Since individuals receive either wage denoted by w
12The production function is assumed to be strictly concave in the benchmark model. Therefore,
it does not include similar discussion about the connections of capital and labor as this model does.
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or unemployment benefit denoted by u, capital income denoted by rk and dividends
denoted by π and have to pay a head tax utility can be written as
ui =
 π + w + rk − h+ V (p) if i = e = employed,π + u+ rk − h+ V (p) if i = u = unemployed. (32)
The last terms of equation (32) describe utility from the leisure time. Governments
maximize the weighted welfare of employed and unemployed. Instead of fixed labor
markets this model assumes efficient labor markets. The wage rate and the level
of unemployment are determined in the labor markets and, thus, there may be
distortions in the labor markets. In this set-up capital tax internalizes the possible
distortion. Labor market distortions are taken into account in the formula of public
good provision. If wages and unemployment are negotiated through an efficient
solution concept such as the monopoly union or the right-to-manage model the
distortion vanishes. In this case undeprovision result reproduces. It is also argued
that in other possible cases the likelihood of overprovision is low.
Static search and matching labor market is included to tax competition frame-
work by Hungerbühler and Van Yperselse (2014). Two countries collect tax revenue
through income and capital taxation. In the case of symmetric countries tax compe-
tition internalizes the externalities of tax competition and the outcome is efficient.
In this set-up there is no social gain from attracting more capital. The social and
opportunity costs of a vacancy are equal if the search effort is efficient. Labor market
frictions and unemployment do not increase the inefficiencies caused by tax compe-
tition. Better labor market conditions present upward pressures on capital taxation.
Better conditions attract firms to open vacancies in that country. This implies that
countries with better labor market institutions are expected to set higher capital
tax rates than the countries with worse labor market institutions.
The effect of imperfect labor markets and trade liberalization on the dynamics
of tax competition is studied by Egger and Seidel (2011). The interesting feature of
this model is that an increase in the labour market frictions between two otherwise
symmetric countries increases tax competition and reduces the Nash equilibrium
tax rates no matter what are the trade costs. Increase in the labor market frictions
mean that countries must respond through the levels of capital taxation. On the
other hand, imperfect labor market has a different effect on tax rates depending on
the level of the trade costs. If the trade costs are high the capital tax rates respond
to increased labor marker frictions in a stronger way. This is because the effects of
trade barriers and labor market frictions are connected.
The effect of unionization is studied by Exbrayat et al. (2012). This model
builds on a two-country framework in which governments maximize welfare and col-
lect capital tax revenues. In their benchmark case labor markets are competitive.
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In this set-up unionizating both countries lowers the level of capital taxation and
welfare. Unions imply that higher wages and lower tax rates are required to main-
tain economic activity. However, if the unions of the countries have different wage
preferences the result is different. The country with less rigid labour market can set
higher capital tax rate. This is because capital searches to a country with less rigid
labor markets although there would be higher level of capital taxation.
Labor unions are also studied by Ogawa et al. (2016) who present a two-country
framework in which one country is unionized and the other country is non-unionized.
Governments are either thought being nonactive in attracting capital inside its bor-
ders or active. Governments use taxes and subsidies as a tool for attracting capital.
If government is inactive then the capital market integration harms the unionized
country and benefits the non-unionized country. This is because in the becnhmark
case unions raise the wage level. Thus, in the unionized country labor is paid more
than the marginal product whereas in the non-unionized country this is not the case.
Therefore, with integration capital goes to non-unionized country and there is un-
employment in the unionized country. If governments are active the result changes.
In this case both countries benefit from tax competition. This is because integration
incentives the unionized country to compete over investments. Attracting capital
increases labor productivity and labor demand. This is a dynamic that lowers the
level of unemployment and improves the situation of the unionized country. The
situation of the non-unionized is similar as earlier although it has to compete over
investments.
Many tax competition models assume that labor is immobile. This assumption
can be questioned. Razin and Sadka (2012) study tax competition in a framework
in which there is labor and capital taxation and labor mobility is possible. Taxation
and migration are connected with a political process through majority voting. In
this model the world economy consists of many countries. Part of the countries
act as host countries for migrants. Migrants are divided to skilled and unskilled
migrants. They serve as labor force in the host countries. Introducing migration
with this spesification leads to a situation in which the total population of host
countries as well as the skill distribution is endogeneously determined through the
migration process. The interesting feature of this model is that tax competition
may lead to higher level of taxation in presence of migration. It is assumed that
the migrants have no capital. This means that the native-born population of the
host countries have to share the capital tax revenue with the migrants. Their labor
taxation does not fully fund the public goods they consume. Migration causes a
leakage effect in which capital tax revenues leak to the migrants. Countries end up
setting too high taxes and offer migrant too high level of public services because of
the leakage effect.
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A relatively new strand of literature focuses on the effects of tax competition
on income distribution. Traub and Yang (2020) present a model that builds on
a two-country framework. Citizens are divided to rich and poor and the latter is
the median voter and the one who decides the capital tax rate. Between-country
inequality is shown to increase because of tax competition while the development of
within-country inequality is not clear. Poor people in a small country may accept less
within-country redistribution if they are able to benefit from the between-country
movement of capital. They provide three distributive effects that affect the changes
in income distribution. The fiscal effect means that tax competition reduces capital
taxation and lowers redistribution. The tax base effect means that tax competition
causes between-country income redistribution since capital moves between countries
and tax bases change. The wage effect means that between-country income is redis-
tributed because capital movement affects the wage income. The total effect of tax
competition on income distribution is a mixture of these effects.
Tax competition model in presence of income redistribution is provided by Yang
(2018). In this model governments are benevolent and tax both labor and capital
income. Public goods are divided to two categories. One of the categories benefits
high-income persons more while the other benefits low income persons more. The
choice of providing one of the categories has distributional consequences. As usual
capital mobility reduces the level of income redistribution. This negative effect can
be counteracted through two mechanisms. Public good provision that benefits low-
income persons could be increased or public good provision that benefits high-income
persons could be decreased. Since capital taxation is lower due to tax competition
labor taxation could be used to finance the possible expansion of public goods. This,
however, requires labor and capital income to be positively correlated since in that
case labor taxation has a positive distributional effect. If the effect is negative labor
taxation should be reduced.13
4.4 Sequential tax competition
In the canonical tax competition model all countries set their taxes at the same
time. It is possible that instead of simultaneous tax setting countries set taxes
sequentally. There may be a leader in tax competition. This leader makes the first
move. After that other countries make their moves based on the leader‘s decision
and the responses of other followers. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2015) apply this
idea in their three-country model in which one of the countries is a Stackelberg
leader. This tax competition game consists of two games. There is a dynamic game
13Part of this analysis is based on Yang (2015) who shows that if the correlation between labor
and capital income is positive a shift from labor taxation to capital taxation is required when
capital markets integrate if redistribution is wanted.
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between the leader and the two followers. In addition, followers play a Nash game
against each other. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2015) empirically test their model
and find evidence on sequential tax competition in which United States serves as
the Stackelberg leader.
The theoretical model by Altshuler and Goodspeed (2015) is presented espe-
cially for deriving estimable functions and being able to empirically assess tax com-
petition. Theoretical sequential tax competition model is provided by Kempf and
Rota-Graziosi (2010) who also endogenize the leadership of tax competition. This
model builds on a two-country framework. Production function denoted by fi(ki)
is allowed to differ across countries. Thus, it introduces asymmetries. Instead of
focusing on the underprovision result this model focuses on the leadership in tax
competition. This is done by presenting an nondistorting income tax denoted by
τi. Capital tax denoted by ti is also included. Including nondistorting income tax
ensures the optimal provision of public goods. The representative citizen‘s utility
function can be written with usual notation as Ui(xi, pi) = xi + pi. The budget con-
straints are given as xi = wi− τi where wi denotes wage and pi = τi + tiki, where ki
denotes capital.
The leadership in the tax competition game is modeled by assuming that coun-
tries play a Stackelberg game. The welfare function of a country is defined as profits
plus the capital income and can be written as
Wi(ti, tj) = fi(ki)− kif ′i(ki) + tiki. (33)
In addition, it is defined that
Φi (ti, tj) = ti + kif ′′j (kj) i 6= j.
If it is assumed that country j acts as the follower the maximization problem it faces
can be written as
tFj (ti) ≡ arg maxWj (tj, ti) ,
tj∈[0,1]






In this set-up country i acts as the leader and the maximization problem it faces
can be written as
























Compared to the simultaneous move game Stackelberg game always leads to higher
equilibrium tax rates when countries are symmetric. The dynamic behind this re-
sult is that when the Stackelberg leader increases it‘s tax rate relative to the Nash
equilibrium level it incentives the follower to also increase tax rate. This is because
capital tax rates are strategic complements. By an increase of the tax rate country
reduces the competitive pressure the other country faces. This is because this de-
cision reduces the capital flight probabilities by lowering the incentives for firms to
relocate. Sequential movement allows countries to avoid Nash tax rates by accepting
that one of them is the leader. With asymmetric countries the results are not as
clear as with symmetric countries.
The leadership of tax competition is endogenized by a timing game14. In the
timing game countries first decide whether they would like to be leaders or follow-
ers. Both countries commit to their choices. In this set-up the subgame perfect
equilibria are the Stackelberg equilibria. Sequential movement is Pareto-improving
for both countries compared to moving simultaneously. At least one country‘s equi-
librium payoff is higher in the Stackelberg game in which it follows than in which
it leads. Thus, this country has the second mover advantage in tax competition.
The opposite effect is called the first mover advantage. Because there are multiple
possible equilibria there is a coordination issues in choosing the leader. The co-
ordination issues can be solved by Pareto-dominance and risk-dominance criteria.
At the risk-dominance subgame perfect equilibria the already well endowed coun-
try follows. Basically, this model implies that the small region is the leader of tax
competition. This is because the smaller region benefits more from the sequential
game. However, this is not a general result. Hindriks and Nishimura (2015) alter
the assumptions of the model and find that large countries are leaders in sequential
tax competition.
Later research has extended the analysis of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010).
Ogawa (2013) considers the capital ownership structure and the implications of it.
In a two-country framework the total amount of capital is denoted by 2k. In country
i the initial capital is denoted with θk such that 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Parameter θ denotes
the structure of capital ownership. If it is zero capital is fully owned by foreign
owners and if it is one capital is fully owned by local owners. Two results with
different capital ownership structures are obtained in the timing game. For foreign
ownership there are two sequential move equilibria in which one country chooses
14In sequential tax competition tradition timing games are applied from the work of Slutsky and
Hamilton (1990).
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its tax rate early while the other chooses late. For the local ownership there is one
equilibrium in which both countries choose their tax rates in the same period. The
main result of this model is that if capital is mostly owned by domestic residents the
equilibrium tax rates are defined by a simultaneous choice. This is because countries
are assumed to be asymmetric and countries with local owners want to manipulate
the price of capital. This is because manipulating the price of capital would benefit
these countries.
Eichner (2014) extends the work by Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) and Ogawa
(2013). The result that there is two sequential equilibria, is obtained if jurisdictions
differ in size or with respect to preferences for public goods. The result that equilibria
is such that both regions simultaneously move early, holds if jurisdictions differ in
productivity. In addition, Eichner (2014) finds an equilibrium in which countries
differ in productivity and the more productive country leads the Stackelberg game.
The last result is new relative to the earlier contributions. It is also in contrast
to that of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) who found that the less productivity
country (the smaller country) acts as the leader.
Hindriks and Nishimura (2017) study capital ownership in the spirit of Kempf
and Rota-Graziosi (2010), Hindriks and Nishimura (2015) and Ogawa (2013). They
build a model in which capital is partially owned by local citizens and partially
by foreign citizens. Their results imply that with low level local ownership the
country with higher productivity is the leader. With mid level local ownership
only the higher productivity country leadership will be the unique subgame perfect
equilibria. With high level regional ownership simultaneous move outcome is like
in Ogawa (2013). The new contribution is that they present preference reversion
effect of tax leadership. This mean that if capital is partially owned by local citizens
tax competition leadership may reverse the preference for taxation of other regions.
This is because preferences are endogenous to the distribution of capital.
Sequential tax competition has interesting dynamics in regional level too. Janeba
and Osterloh (2013) present a model with metropolitan area and cities. Each city has
many associated areas called hinderlands. In the first stage all cities simultaneously
determine their tax rates. Then the fully mobile capital moves between cities and
all hinderlands choose their tax rates simultaneously. Finally, capital is allocated
between the city and the hinderland associated with it. When tax competition
is sequential the tax rate of the city converges to zero when the number of cities
becomes great. The tax rate of hinderland, in turn, is bounded above zero. These
results are in contrast to the simultaneous move situation in which all the tax rates
converge to zero when the number of metropolitan areas becoming great. Cities
react by shifting taxation to immobile factors (labor) harder than the hinderlands.
This is because cities face stronger competitive pressures than the hinderlands.
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4.5 Investments and profit shifting
One of the important phenomena in modern business environment is foreign direct
investment. Multinational corporations can operate in many countries and the lo-
cation of investments is important. On the other hand, multinational corporations
may shift paper profits instead of investing to foreign country. In addition, bidding
literature is briefly reviewed. This literature is based on the fact that governments
may want to bid for firms and investments by issuing different subsidy programs.
Profit shifting literature includes general profit shifting models and models that
focus on tax havens. As presented earlier tax havens are small countries that offer
zero or near to zero capital tax rates and sometimes other special treatment to
foreign investments. The impact of tax havens in world economy may be great.
For example, according to Tørsløv et al. (2018) multinational corporation shift 40
percent of their worldwide profits to tax haven.
4.5.1 Foreign direct invesment
Multinatinational corporations may be willing to invest in many countries. Haufler
and Wooton (1999) model foreign direct investment in a two-country model in which
one country has greater population than the other. Both countries have competitive
production sector which produces a numeraire good. In addition, countries have
another sector in which the production happens under imperfect competition. This
model includes international trade and trade costs are modelled. Instead of mod-
elling the possible underprovision of public goods this model studies which one of
the countries attracts the investment. It is argued that the bigger country attracts
the firm and wins the tax competition. Trade costs are assumed symmetric in which
case both countries end up to set negative tax rates. They are willing to subsidy the
firm in order to attract it and save the trade costs. The bigger country sets lower
tax rate or bigger subsidy since in per capita terms the subsidy is, in fact, smaller.
Often in tax competition literature firms make decisions based on the capital
tax rates of countries. Business environment is often more complicated. Different
countries may have different depreciation allowances and different regulations. Firms
willing to enter the market need to place extra resources in search costs in figuring
how the tax systems works. Konrad (2011) studies search costs and concludes that
if search costs are high tax competition pressure may be lower and that countries
may choose effective tax rates that maximize the tax revenue. If search costs are
high only part of firms are willing to place resources in figuring the effective tax
rates of countries and tax competition pressures are, therefore, lower.
Investors may have an attachment to a country.This changes the idea that in-
vestment locations are purely chosen by tax rate differentials. Home bias in which
investor is more willing to invest in the home country is an example of this kind
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of behavior. Ogura (2006) studies effects of home bias in tax competition. This
model is otherwise very similar to the benchmark model but individuals in country
i are indexed by ni which is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and allows to write the
budget constraint of the type ni individual as
cni =
 wi + piwi + pi − ya (ni) , (34)
where the first equation describes the budget constraint when capital is invested
in country i and the second equation describes the budget constraint when capital
is invested in the other country. In the second equation of equation (34) the term
ya (ni) describes the cost of investing to other regions. This cost is related to the
attachment to home. Performing similar calculations as for the benchmark model
shows that public goods are underprovided. The interesting issue, however, is that
underprovision is smaller than underprovision in the case with no attachment. This
results seems intuitive. With attachment to home investors are more willing to invest
to home country even with higher capital tax rates. This reduces the underprovision
of public goods compared to the case with no attachment.
4.5.2 Bidding
In present business environment countries aim to attract industries and firms. Coun-
tries may, for example, subsidy firms or certain industries in order to attract them.
Subsidies are part of the analysis above but there is an own literature strand focusing
on this behavior called bidding over firms.15
The first formal bidding model is presented by Black and Hoyt (1989). In this
model two countries compete over two industries. Both industries consists of one
large and many small companies. Countries provide investment incentive programs
for the firms in order to attract them. In this model bidding is welfare improving.
Bidding ensures the efficient location of the firm and can only increase social effi-
ciency. The location of the firms creates positive spillover effects since small firms
may also want to locate to the country after the large firm has.
Bidding may take place in different forms. Furusawa et al. (2015) present a
bidding model that operates based on an English auction16. Countries may induce
each other bidding further. The equilibrium winning bid is greater in English auc-
tion. This may result as an inefficient location of the foreign direct investment. In
15Descriptive evidence on bidding behavior is reviewed by Greenstone and Moretti (2003).
16English auction means an auction mechanism in which the auctioneer opens an auction and
allows participants to raise their bids openly. Eventually only one bidder is left and she gets the
item. English auction is one auction mechanism. The others are the Dutch auction, the first-price
sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction. McAfee and McMillan (1987) review
auction mechanisms and their properties.
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an English auction there are incentives for firms to encourage countries to respond
to bids. This generates uncertainty about the winner‘s identity and the winning
bid. In this case bidding may not be welfare improving. The investment incentives
may be too large and the societal benefits may be transferred to the firm. This
phenomenon is in the literature known as the race beyond the bottom. It deepens
the race to the bottom hypothesis of the benchmark model.
If markets are operating in an imperfect manner and international trade is pos-
sible governments may not need to bid. This argument is presented by Ferrett and
Wooton (2010) who model competition over foreign direct investment in a duopoly
with two countries and two firms. In this scenario because of the trade costs firms
need to spatially separate themselves in order to enjoy higher profits and thus locate
one in each country. Ferrett and Wooton (2020) further develop the framework by
considering a scenario in which countries can bid only over one firm. In this game
countries anticipate the results of the bidding and the losing government is better
not to participate. Instead it can try to attract the other firm.
Political economy of bidding is considered by Hopp and Kriebel (2019). In
their model median voter offers the bid and countries may have low-skilled or high-
skilled majority. It is welfare enhancing to regulate granting of subsidies because
it prevents minority to exploit majority. In addition, it is argued that regions with
low-skilled majority may not have the political support for higher bids. This is
because they may have lower incentives to pay for the location of the firm. As a
result of the location decision high-skilled individuals end up with higher wages but
the low-skilled individuals may end up with higher rents or benefit less relative to
the high-skilled individuals.
4.5.3 Profit shifting
Multinational corporations may engage in profit shifting in order to reduce their tax
burden as decribed in chapter two. Keen and Konrad (2013) reverse the commodity
tax competition model of Kanbur and Keen (1993) to a corporate tax competition
model focusing on profit shifting. The original model assumes a borderline region
between two countries such that inhabitants of the countries can shop in either side
of the border. Commodity tax rate differs between countries and consumers may
want to shop in the country in which it is cheaper.
Underprovision of public goods is not modeled but it is shown that smaller
countries set lower tax rates. It is assumed that two countries (i = 1, 2) lenght of
unity are located in a line where there is a border in the middle. Population size
given by hi differs between the countries. Citizens buy one unit of good. If good is
bought from the home country denoted by i = 1 citizens pays the home country tax
denoted by t1. If good is bought from the foreign country citizens pays the foreign
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country tax denoted by t2 and a transportation cost denoted by δ. It is assumed
that home country has lower tax rate. In this case all home country inhabitants
buy the domestic good. Inhabitants of the foreign country also buy from the home
country if t1 + δ < t2. This means that a proportion denoted as
s = t2 − t1
δ
buy from the home country. Thus, the tax revenues of the countries can be calculated
by summing the tax revenue from domestic shoppers and from foreign shoppers for
the country number one and by substracting the tax revenue going abroad to the
total revenue for the country number two. Maximizing revenues yields the Nash



















If the tax rate in the smaller country is lower there exist a Nash equilibrium given
in equations (35). This implies that smaller countries set lower tax rate. However,
it is useful to note that the reasoning is opposite to that of the benchmark model.
Instead of deriving tax rate as in the benchmark model this model assumes tax rates
and shows that a Nash equilibrium exists. This is important since Nash equilibrium
does not always exist.
Idea of this model is reversed to study tax competition in presence of profit shift-
ing. Instead of assuming cross border shopping it is assumed that a multinational
corporation operates in both countries. It is also assumed that country number one
has lower tax rate such that multinational has an incentive to shift profits to this
country. The fraction of profit shifted from country two to country one is denoted
with s. Shifting operations are costly since there are costs to design shifting and a
risk of penalty. Therefore, the cost is assumed to take a form given by 12δs
2Πi where
the last term denotes the profits of the multinational firm in country i. Profit of the
firm can be written as




Maximizing equation (36) with respect to si shows that the result given by equations
(35) holds in profit shifting framework such that Πi replaces population shares. This
means that the model by Kanbur and Keen (1993) can be translated to become a
profit shifting model. On the other hand, Keen and Konrad (2013) note that this
result also means that instead of country being smaller in the population sense it
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may have lower aggregate productivity and, thus, set lower tax rate. If country has
low aggregate productivity it loses little revenue by lowering it‘s tax rate but can
attract profits from other countries and, thus, gain revenue. This intuition makes it
sensible that countries with lower aggregate productivity set lower tax rate.
Implications of profits shifting are studied by Eichner and Runkel (2011). In
this multi-country model one representative multinational corporation has a plant
in each country. The multinational corporation may shift profits and shifting is
denoted by si. If term si is greater than zero multinational corporation shifts profits
to this country and if it is smaller than zero it shifts profits from this country. If
the multinational engages in profit shifting it must pay concealment costs to make
profit shifting possible. These costs are presented in the model as concealment costs
by a U-shaped function C(si).
Production technology is decribed by a production function f(ki, li) such that
capital and labor are the factors of production. It is assumed that capital pays inter-
est denoted by r. Part of the capital cost is deductible. The fraction of deductible
cost is denoted by p ∈ [0, 1[. Labor is paid with wage rate denoted by wi. With
these definitions the tax base of multinational in a country i can be written as
φi = f(ki, li)− prki − wili + si. (37)
Each country has a profit tax denoted by ti. The total profits of the multinational
corporation can be written as a function of the tax base given in equation (37), the











The multinational corporation maximizes profits. As usual an unilateral increase
in the profit tax rate reduces capital in the country. On the other hand, capital
and labor are complementaries. This implies that a decrease in capital reduces
labor demand. This, in turn, implies that the wage rate decreases as a result of
an unilateral increase of the tax rate. In addition, if a country unilaterally raises
it‘s tax rate the multinational lowers the level of profit shifting to this country and
increases it to other countries.
Governments maximize tax revenue17. Profit shifting and tax competition cause
two externalities. Profit shifting externality presents the dynamics in which an
increase in tax rate of a country incentives the multinational corporation to shift
profits to the other countries. This externality drives tax rates to inefficiently low
levels. Tax base externality presents the effect of one country‘s tax rate to the true
17Leviathan behavior is discussed in chapter 4.6.
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tax base of other countries. The true tax base is profits less profit shifting.
The sign of this effect is ambiguous because it is derived from several subeffects.
Increases in one country‘s tax rate cause a decrease in capital demand and world
interest rate. This positively affects the tax base of other countries because capital
costs are lower. In addition, reduction in interest rate increases investments to this
country. Capital and labor are assumed to be complementary. This means that
labor demand increases in the other country and causes wage rate to increase. This
has a negative effect on the tax base. Together profit shifting externality and the
tax base externality imply a situation in which the Nash equilibrium tax rates are
inefficiently low. The effect of profit shifting externality is clear. Tax base externality
can partly but not fully offset this effect. This result is similar to earlier models.
However, the endogenously given interest rate makes the inefficiency of tax rates
less visible because of the possible offsetting of the tax base externality.
Multinational corporations can shift profits via several channels. Choi et al.
(forthcoming) study the incentives to shift profits via transfers mispricing18. Their
model builds on a two-country framework in which one country is a low-tax country
while the other is a high tax country. Multinational corporation behaves monopo-
listically and chooses monopoly price as the transfer price. Because multinational
corporation uses monopoly price as the transfer price the home government may
want to limit transfer mispricing and responds with more stringent transfer pricing
regulation. The interesting feature of the model is that it is shown that both the
high tax and the low-tax countries want the high tax country to legislate stringent
enough transfer price regulation. This is because with stringent enough transfer
pricing regulation the high tax country adjusts to some level of profit shifting since
it allows to maintain higher tax rate. The low-tax country also wants the high tax
country to set stringent enough transfer price regulation. This is because with too
light transfer pricing regulation race to the bottom occurs and eliminates the incen-
tives for profit shifting. Thus, race to the bottom would harm the low-tax country
too.
Labor markets are added to profit shifting framework by Krautheim and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2016) who study tax competition with profit shifting and wage bargaining
in a two-country framework. The model consists of a large high tax country with
monopolistically competitive sector and a small low-tax country that has an affiliate
of the multinational firm in it. Governments of both the low-tax and the high tax
countries are assumed to maximize the welfare of their citizen‘s. The interesting
feature of this model is that it shows that profit shifting reduces the wages of the
employees in addition to reducing the tax revenue. Multinational corporation has
operations in both countries. The employees only know the productivity of their
18See chapter 2.2 for arm‘s lenght pricing and other principles of international taxation.
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own plant but not the productivity of other plants of the multinational corporation.
Thus, the employer has an informational advantage. When wages are bargained
firms are able to get rent in the form of lower wages because they can shift profits
to the low-tax country.
Foreign direct investment and profit shifting is united with a discussion about
the institutional quality of the tax administration of a country by Gresik et al.
(2020). In this model there is a single national welfare maximizing host country
for foreign direct investment and a continuum of multinational corporations able
to shift profits via transfer prices and internal debt. They argue that foreign di-
rect investment improves every country‘s welfare because production increases as
a result of it. However, the increase may be outweighted if quality of tax revenue
administration is weak. The quality of administration means the ability to audit
and correct transfer mispricing behavior. This is because with weak institutional
quality multinational can shift more profits. This, in turn, increases corporate tax
revenue losses. In addition, if the quality of the tax revenue administration is weak
countries may put such policies in place that are bad for investment.
4.5.4 Tax havens
Profit shifting can occur in two ways. Profits can be either shift to other high tax
country with a lower corporate tax rate or to tax haven. Tax haven are often small
nations which offer near zero taxation and possibly other investment incentives19.
Dharmapala (2008) reviews the literature on the consequences of tax havens to the
high tax countries. The existence of tax havens increases tax competition. The high
tax countries may choose lower tax rates than they would when competing only
with other high tax countries. On the other hand, tax havens may be good for the
welfare of the high tax countries too. This is idea supported by the fact that at least
part of tax haven operations could be forbidden by simple legislation but countries
have not done that. Therefore, the effects of tax havens seem not clear at all.
Tax havens are included to tax competition framework by Slemrod and Wilson
(2009) who model tax havens as parasites that take tax revenue from other countries.
This model is an extension of the benchmark model. Firms are assumed to be
making a choice whether to participate to profit shifting or not. If firm chooses
to participate it has to pay set-up and concealment costs. Governments try to
restrict profit shifting to tax havens and, thus, have enforcement expenditure. The
objective of the government is to maximize utility of the representative citizen. It is
shown that the existence of tax havens is welfare worsening. Without tax havens all
countries could increase public good provision by increasing taxation in such that
19Broader discussion on development of tax havens and their operating is provided by Garcia
Pires (2013).
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the wage rate remains fixed since capital stock does not change. Eliminating tax
havens does not change the factor prices but increases private consumption. This
is because there are efficiency gains. A rise in private consumption increases the
marginal benefit from public good consumption since public good is a normal good.
Thus, eliminating tax havens raises the equilibrium level of public good provision
and increases the welfare in the high tax countries.
Another approach to modelling tax competition and tax havens is provided by
Hong and Smart (2010). This model is based on a two-sector framework with
workers and entrepreuners. One of the sectors uses imported capital and domestic
labor and is called the multinational sector. The other sector uses domestic capital
from entrepreuner class and labor. Both production technologies can be used to
produce single homogeneous consumption good. This set-up implies very different
results than that of Slemrod and Wilson (2009). An increase in international tax
planning causes an increase in the tax rate and welfare. The key driver of this
result is a mechanism which shows that tax planning reduces the tax revenue but
it also makes the location decisions of a multinational less responsive to the tax
rate differentials. The second effect which is called the investment-enhancing effect
dominates the first effect called the revenue-erosion effect. This model, thus, presents
a contrary view to that of Wilson and Slemrod (2009).
Another more positive view on tax havens is provided by Johannesen (2010) who
argues that tax havens may have a positive total effect on the tax revenue of the
high tax countries. According to this view tax revenues of the high tax countries
are affected by tax havens through leakage effect, competition effect and crowding
effect. Leakege effect works by reducing the tax base of the high tax countries.
Competition effect presents downward competitive pressures on tax rates posed by
the presence of tax havens. Both of these effects have negative implications for tax
revenue of the high tax countries. However, the total effect of tax havens on tax
revenue of the high tax countries may be positive. This is because the crowding
effect may outweight the two other effects. The crowding effect is defined as an
effect in which the low-tax countries increase their tax rates since does not seem
good to compete with tax rates in presence of tax havens. Since the crowding effect
means an increase in tax revenue the total effect on tax revenue depends on the
volume of leakage, competition and crowding effects respectively.
Heterogeneous profits are added to tax haven framework by Krautheim and
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011). In their model there is a high tax country in which firms
operate monopolistically. Firms face taxation which they may want to avoid by
opening an affiliate in the tax haven. The high tax country and the tax haven play
a simultaneous move Nash game and decide their tax rates noncooperatively. The
gains from profit shifting depend on the level of profits a firm has. In the equilibrium
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the most productive firms shift profits. Usually larger firms are more productive and
they have better possibilities to shift profits. This implies that tax competition is
strongest when the distribution of firm profits is such that productive firms account
for a large share of the total profits. Thus, the distribution and changes of firm
profits affects whether tax competition increases or decreases.
It may be that the tax policies of countries are affected by interest groups. Chu
et al. (2015) present a tax competition model in which many high tax countries
compete for mobile capital and tax havens exists. Capital owners in the high tax
countries create a lobbying organizations which put pressures on the politicians to
lower the level of capital taxation. Profit shifting to tax havens drives capital out and
makes the immobile tax bases to carry the tax burden. Owners of capital want to
avoid this by lobbying. It is argued that in the equilibrium tax rates are inefficiently
low. An increase in profit shifting reduces welfare of the high tax countries if the
political effect of lobbying drives tax rates further down under the efficient level.
However, there is also a welfare improving effect of profit shifting which. Allowing
differential tax treatment for mobile and immobile capital is welfare improving. If
this effect outweights the political effect an increase in profit shifting is welfare
improving for the high tax countries.
4.6 Political economy and tax competition
Political economy of tax competition is not part of many of the early models of
tax competition. However, political economy of tax competition is a fruithul theme
of research. One important political economy question concerns the objectives of
government. In the benchmark model governments are benevolent. This means
that governments maximize utility of the representative citizens. The assumption of
benevolent governments has been questioned and there is a wide discussion about
other possible objectives of governments20. Instead of benevolent behavior it is
proposed that governments maximize tax revenue or in some cases their own utility.
This kind of government is called Leviathan.
Leviathan behavior and tax competition is by studied Edwards and Keen (1996).
The government‘s objective connect benevolent government and Leviathan behavior.
The model builds on the benchmark model but politicians maximize utility that is
derived from utility of the representative citizen and from an item in that benefits
only the politicians. Collected tax revenue must finance both public goods and the
item that benefits only the politician. Following the steps of chapter 3.1.1 yields
that public goods are underprovided. The result is intuitive since governments use
tax revenue not only to public goods but also in their own interest.
20See, for example, Oates (1985), Forbes and Zampelli (1989), Oates (1989), Zax (1989) and
Brulhart and Jametti (2019) for a discussion.
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Usually the objectives of government are exogenously given. Pal and Sharma
(2013) endogenize the objectives of governments. It is shown that it is optimal
for countries to choose tax revenue maximization behavior (Leviathan) instead of
welfare maximization (benevolent). This is because welfare maximization increases
tax competition. Countries are more aggressive relative to tax revenue maximization
if welfare maximization is the objective. They want to decrease tax rate more than
other countries have decreased. This result shows that race to the bottom can be
restricted when countries move from welfare maximization to revenue maximization.
Wang and Ogawa (2018) further develop this framework by assuming that capital
is owned by foreigners owned and capital supply elasticity with respect to interest
rate is positive. If capital supply elasticity with respect to interest rate is low welfare
maximizing governments choose Leviathan behavior. With low capital supply elac-
ticity with respect to interest rate governments maximize the welfare of the citizens
better by acting as Leviathans. In Kawachi‘s et al. (2018) model capital can be
domestic or foreign owned. The structure of the ownership affects the incentives of
governments. Foreign owners prefer small tax rates since return goes abroad. In
this case governments choose Leviathan behavior. If capital is domestic owned gov-
ernments choose a mix of Leviathan and benevolent behavior. These results reflect
the fact that with foreign owned capital Leviathan behavior (revenue maximization
in this case) is the best way for governments to act.
The benchmark model and almost all later literature assumes that governments
behave in a Nash manner. This means that the optimal response is the one that
provides the maximum welfare. Eichner and Pethig (2020) reconsider this assump-
tion and propose that governments may act in a Kantian manner. This means that
countries are guided by the Kant‘s categorical imperative21. The analysis is per-
formed in a two-country framework in which one or both countries can be Nashian
or Kantian. The model suggest that a Kantian country always chooces a higher
tax rate than a Nashian. This is because the Kantian has a steeper best response
curve than the Nashian. On the other hand, the results depict the fact utility in the
country behaving in Kantian manner is greater which makes it intuitive for choosing
Kantian behavior. The key driver of these results is that Kantian behavior decreases
the harmful effects of tax competition which are present in Nashian behavior.
In addition to the diversity of government behavior the canonical tax competi-
tion model lacks democratic decision making process. Persson and Tabellini (1990)
consider a two-country tax competition model with two periods. Countries are
assumed to organize elections in which governments are chosen. The chosen govern-
21Kantian behavior in economics is based on the analysis by Romer (2010) and it is further
developed by Romer (2015). The main difference between Nashian and Kantian behavior is that
Kantian behavior results in efficient solution with negative and positive externalities which is not
true for Nashian behavior.
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ment chooses the policy conducted. The political process depicts the fact that the
chosen politicians may have different policy preferences than the median voter. It is
shown that policy mechanism offsets some of the negative consequences of tax com-
petition by choosing new politician who is more “left-leaning” than the earlier one.
Thus, the tax rate may not lower as much as it would with the old politician. These
results reflect that political processes may be a key factor in maintaining positive
levels of corporate taxation. In fact, it may be that political process decreases tax
competition.
Political decision making process and sequential tax competition are united by
Pal and Sharm (2019). The politicians are elected by majority voting and then
the politician of the leader country decides it‘s tax rates. After that the politician
in the follower country observes the tax rate of the leader and decides it‘s own tax
rate. Finally, investors with mobile capital choose how to allocate resources between
these countries. It is argued that the follower country chooses a government that
has higher preference for public good than the median voter. In the leader country
the median voter herself becomes the politicians. These results are driven by an
anticipation effect. Follower country makes political delegation first by appointing
politician with high preferences for public good because it anticipates that as a
follower it is incentiviced to set lower tax rate. By making the political delegation
first the follower country incentives the leader country to set higher tax rate than it
would otherwise had. Sequential choice in political process set-up, thus, restricts the
race to the bottom because with this mechanism undercutting race may not occur.
The effects of tax competition under different political systems are studied by
Janeba and Schjelderup (2009). The key idea of this model is to compare presidential-
congressional and parliamentary regimes. In the first system tax and exdenditure
policy are assumed to be legislated by different individuals whereas in the second
one same individuals legislate both. Politicians are viewed as rent seekers. However,
due to re-election concerns politicians are somewhat interested in public service also.
Under the presidential regime tax competition does not affect the public good sup-
ply since different persons decide the tax and expenditure policy. Since the tax rate
decreases due to tax competition citizens are better off. In the parliamentary regime
tax competition increases the underprovision of public goods. If public goods are
sufficiently valued tax competition may make citizen worse off. Thus, if same per-
sons decide budget as a whole tax competition may worsen welfare but if different
persons decide different parts of budget tax competition may increase welfare.
The preferences of citizens are interesting in tax competition. Tiebout (1956)
describes society in which citizens choose their locations based on their preferences.
Brueckner (2000) considers tax competition when the preferences of citizens differ.
Public goods are provided by a community developer who wants to earn profit from
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the provision of public good. In this model countries are formed by community
developers and consumers then sort based on their preferences. In equilibrium high-
demand communities have high tax rates and small capital stocks. Low-demand
communities have low tax rates and large capital stocks. As in the benchmark
model the country that sets high tax rate enhances the outflow of capital to other
countries.
Aging is a wide phenomenon is western countries in the 2000s. It affects both
the supply and the demand side of the economy. In addition, it may affect the
politics. Older persons are more likely to vote. This may affect the choice of policy.
Tax competition and aging is considered by Morita et al (2020) who present a two-
country overlapping generations model in which one country has growing (young)
population while the other has declining (aging) population. Politicians commit to
a certain corporate tax rate and are elected through majority voting. Corporate
tax, thus, reflects the preferences of voters. The results of the election depend on
the structure of population. If population is growing young people represent the
majority and if it is declining old people represent the majority. This model implies
that race to the bottom occurs if individuals prefer public good consumption over
private good consumption. If not capital taxation is set inefficiently high which
results to a race to the top. Race to the top is more likely to occur in society
with declining population. This is because capital taxation has a negative effect
on domestic younger people. This effect is not present in society with growing
population. In addition, the outflow effect of capital is more damaging in society
with aging population.
4.7 Discussion on further perspectives to tax competition
theory
This chapter broadens the perspectives on tax competition. Institutional frame-
works that are not part of the canonical tax competition model are introduced
and their impact on tax competition is studied. On the other hand, methodolo-
gies of modelling tax competition are further widened although most of the applied
methodologies are presented in the previous chapter. However, in this chapter it
is highlighted that different phenomena may demand different methodology. For
example, studying the effects of aging on tax competition may demand overlapping
generations model.
All issues studied in this chapter are important in order to fully understand
the dynamics of tax competition. However, parts of the chapter stand out. Income
redistribution and inequality has become an important theme in both economics and
public discourse. It seem natural to expect that the importance of tax competition
research on these themes increases. These issues are also a part of the tradition
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studying labor markets and tax competition. Another possibly rising theme for
future research is the effect of tax competition on employment.
In addition, issues relating to investment are important. Tax competition is
possible because multinational corporations have possibilities to invest abroad and
shift their profits. Thus, it is important to understand the dynamics of these issues.
Tax haven literature is young and developing. It is interesting because two views
can be separated. The view based on the tradition starting from Slemrod and
Wilson (2009) views tax competition as harmful whereas the tradition starting from
Hong and Smart (2010) views it as non-harmful. These traditions have opposite
understanding on the implications of tax havens. The first traditions views tax
havens as parasites. Tax havens erode the tax revenue of the high tax countries.
The second tradition views profit shifting to tax havens as an efficiency enhancing
issue. Because profit shifting to tax havens is possible location decisions may not be
as sensible to the tax rate differentials. It is interesting to see how these traditions
develop and if there is convergence between the opposing views.
In decentrally governed countries vertical tax competition may be especially im-
portant issue to understand. Tax competition may drive tax rates down in national
level due to international pressures. However, the response of regional governments
may be to increase their tax rates. Thus, vertical tax competition may offset part
of the harmful consequences of tax competition. This view emphasizes the role of
national and regional governments. The dynamics of vertical tax competition may
have implications to regionalities being providers of public services.
Sequential tax competition is important for fully understanding the dynamics
of tax competition. The benchmark model as well as many later models of tax
competition view tax competition as a simultaneous move game. However, it seems
natural that some countries act first. It may be that tax competition starts with a
conscious decision. This may explain why race to the bottom is not observed. Firstly,
tax rates are higher in sequential tax competition in simultaneous tax competition.
Secondly, sequential nature of tax competition implies that there could be cycles
of tax competition. The leader may decide after one round of lowering tax rates, for
example, that there is a break in tax competition. This break may last for a while.
However, at some point it may be that the leader decides to start tax competition
again. There is evidence that, for example, the tax reform of United States in 1986
served as a watershed moment for tax competition (Altshuler and Goodspeed 2015).
These moments can be seen as starting points of new cycles of tax competition.
One interesting issue is to considered is that in which cases tax competition in-
creases and in which cases it decreases. Some models explicitly answer this question
while the others do not. In the benchmark model tax competition increases when
some country lowers it‘s tax rates. This is because lowering the tax rate incentives
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other countries to lower their tax rates. Tax competition may incease also if la-
bor market frictions between symmetric countries increase or if governments change
their objectives from revenue maximization to welfare maximization. On the other
hand, tax competition decreases if the market power of countries increases or if tax
competition is sequential instead of simultaneous.
One of the important questions of theories of tax competition is whether tax
competition is harmful or not. It is difficult to address this question comprehensively
for multiple reasons. Firstly, there is no joint definition of harmful. Secondly, tax
competition is an international phenomenon. Therefore, harmful to some countries
may be good for the others. It may be that, for example, as a consequence of
tax competition some high tax countries witness decreasing corporate tax revenue
whereas the others are able to attract the firms and benefit from their presence.
Something can be said about the possible harmfulness of tax competition based
on the research literature. Firstly, in the literature stemming from the benchmark
model natural definition of harmfulness is that tax competition is harmful if it
causes underprovision of public goods. This definition implies that tax competition
is harmful according to many model of this tradition. Since tax rates are driven
too low to provide an efficient level of public goods tax competition is an unwanted
phenomenon.
On the other hand, tax competition can be seen as non-harmful. As described
above part of tax haven literature views tax havens and tax competition as non-
harmful. Since tax havens may make the location choices less respondent to the
tax rate differential tax havens improve the positions of the high tax countries.
In addition, part of political economy tradition views governments as Leviathans.
Tax competition restricts the power of single governments. Therefore, governments
cannot expand themselves as much. Thus, tax competition enhances efficiency and
is non-harmful.
Theoretical aspects of harmfulness described above are important in providing in-
sights to the question. A complete answer requires asnwers to spesific subquestions.
For example, it would be important to understand the effect of tax competition
on economic growth. Many of the welfare institutions of westerns countries are fi-
nanced through increased tax revenue. This, in turn, is a consequence of economic
growth and improved collection of taxes. For the future of public finances it would
be essential to understand the connection between tax competition and economic
growth.
On the other hand, tax competition may have effects on inequality, employment,
tax revenue and the composition of public goods. All these issues affect the welfare
of citizens. There is already some research on these themes but more is demanded.
Before proceeding to answer the question one should answer all the subquestions
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above. These subquestions are, however, out of the scope of this thesis. They
are introduced as an agenda for future research in order to be able to address the
harmfulness of tax competition.
If tax competition is hamrful it favors to limit it. Part of the dimensions of
hamrfulness of tax competition are policy-oriented such as the initiatives of OECD
to prevent hamrful tax competition. In fact, the OECD efforts imply that tax
competition is hamrful. Governments are willing to coordinate in order to limit tax
competition. This suggests that governments view tax competition as harmful. If
it would not be harmful governments would not put resources in efforts to limit tax
competition.
On the other hand, it does not seem clear how severe are the consequences
of tax competition. Corporate income tax rates have fallen but are yet far from
zero and corporate tax revenues have to some extend remained stable. However,
it can be that the decline of corporate income tax rates continues. Lower levels
of taxation transmit to economy and social policy as less capability to maintain
public service and transfer levels. This may be a challenge for modern welfare
states. Harmonization of taxation is politically hard in international level but the




This thesis reviews theories of tax competition. The focus is on surveying theoretical
modelling tax competition. In addition, studying the effects of different institutional
frameworks on the dynamics of tax competition is important. The choice to highlight
the institutional complexity of tax competition broadens recent review literature
which focuses on policy issues such as limiting tax competition and profit shifting
(Keen and Konrad 2013; Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca 2014).
Chapter two focuses on the institutional backround of tax competition. It is
shown that the principles of international corporate taxation created at the 1920s
have an impact on tax competition. These principles are created for a different busi-
ness environment. The rise of new business models shows that there are problems
in applying these principles in modern business environment. The contradiction be-
tween the principles of international corporate taxation and modern business models
sets part of the institutional foundations of tax competition.
Chapters three and four discuss theories of tax competition. Chapter three
presents the canonical tax competition model and discusses the effects of changing
the key assumptions of the benchmark model. The famous underprovision result
is discussed. Chapter four reviews further developments of theories of tax compe-
tition. It is shown that tax competition is modeled applying different institutional
frameworks. Modern phenomena like tax havens have become an important part of
theories of tax competition.
The first research question this thesis aims to answer is how should the canonical
tax competition model be defined. Canonicality is used in earlier literature but
defining it has been problematic. This thesis proposes that in the context of theories
of tax competition canonicality should be seen through the history of economic
thought of tax competition. Instead of viewing the canonical tax competition model
as a single model it is an abstraction in which the most important ideas of different
modelling traditions unite.
The second theme of research questions concerns the implications of tax com-
petition. It was argued that this thesis should answer whether the underprovision
result of the benchmark model holds with more general assumptions. As shown and
discussed earlier the underprovision result is strong and often holds even though
the key assumptions are relaxed. The underprovision results is interesting. Based
on the spesifications of utility and production functions and other key variables it
seems hard to reach conclusion other than underprovision of public goods.
The assumptions about the nature of production function are, for example,
strong. These assumptions may be easy to justify. However, if the assumptions
of production function are relaxed the underprovision result changes22. Although
22This issue is briefly discussed at the beginning of chapter 4.3.
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the underprovision result is strong it may be that it is a necessary implication of
the methology used in the benchmark model. On the other hand, the underpro-
vision result is intuitive and useful which may explain the key role it plays in tax
competition literature.
Another research question of this thesis is to describe the key implications of
models that do not model underprovision of public goods. One of the key insights
provided in the thesis is that different sized countries play different roles in tax
competition. There is, for example, both empirical and theoretical evidence that
bigger countries act as leaders of tax competition. On the other hand, they may
often succeed in attracting investment because it is less costly or because there may
be agglomeration forces. A key theme relating to both asymmetries and sequential
tax competition is to understand the long term nature of tax competition. Especially
interesting issue is whether there are cycles of tax competition. It is possible that tax
competition proceeds in different speeds in different decades. On the other hand,
the role of larger and smaller countries is essential in understanding the possible
cycles of tax competition and the dynamics they have.
In future research the role of international organizations should be highlighted.
Issues focusing on limiting tax competition are out of the scope of this thesis but the
impact of players like European union or OECD should be highlighted from a new
perspective. European union brings together smaller nations that together form a
bigger entity. It would be interesting to study the implications of this player in tax
competition. On the other hand, literature on foreign direct investment and profit
shifting is current. The ongoing work to limit profit shifting and tax competition
urges more knowledge about these issues.
Almost all literature presented focuses on theories of tax competition. Another
prominent field for future research is the empirics of tax competition. Empirical
modelling of tax competition is a growing field but it faces some issues regarding
how to measure and estimate tax competition. On the other hand, theoretical
models make it possible to derive estimable tax reaction functions such as those of
Devereux et al. (2008) or Egger and Raff (2015). Theoretical literature can also
give empirically testable hypotheses.
The dynamics of tax competition are very interesting. Eventually, the key issue
is whether tax competition is harmful or not. It is not clear whether this can be jus-
tified based on earlier research but for policy makers it is of first class importance. If
the initiatives aiming to limit tax competition such as the work of OECD want to be
successful there should be a joint view on the harmfulness of tax competition. Since
work is done to limit tax competition it seems natural to assume that politicians
view it as harmful.
However, research can provide insights to this question as argued in the discussion
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of chapter four. Tax competition can be seen as harmful when welfare decreases as
a result of it. Thus, based on research literature tax competition can be seen as
harmful in many cases. In addition, future research could try to figure out the
consequences of tax competition on economic growth, inequality, total tax revenue
and composition of public goods. Gaining wide enough perspectives on different
aspects of harmfulness would enhance the possibilities to answer the question with
certainty.
In the end, the suitable level of corporate income taxation is a political decision.
However, it is good to keep in mind that taxation has effects described in the second
chapter of this thesis. On the other hand, increased international competition may
have results described by the underprovision result. Based on this thesis it seems
useful to be concerned about tax competition. An important part of the total tax
revenue is collected through corporate income taxation in many countries. Too much
downward pressure may lead to possibly harmful decisions such as lowering the level
of public services or substituting the loss corporate tax revenue by other taxes. This
means that the tax burden of others may increase as a result of tax competition.
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